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“To speak with precision of public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy 
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 Many people understand religion and science to be incompatible fields of study. They 
often assume that religious people reject science out of hand or that scientific minded people do 
not rely on religious ideas in their personal lives. Indeed, there are some issues where the 
contradiction seems to be more apparent than others (e.g., queer rights). Nevertheless, this view 
ignores the way religion can be utilized in service of supporting these science-based issues. For 
example, many religious doctrines teach about humanity’s stewardship of the planet and our duty 
to mitigate the effects of climate change. In addition, there are also teachings about the value of 
preserving human lives, which might lead someone to support vaccination policies. In this thesis, 
I will examine public opinion on these two issues, climate change and vaccines, as well as their 
relationships to religiosity. 
 The other major question running through this paper involves the relationship between 
support for these liberal policies and the use of religious language. Very often religiosity is 
monopolized by evangelical voters, who reliably vote Republican.1 However, I want to explore 
to what extent religious language can be used in motivating a conservative to support policies 
associated with the left (such as the mitigation of climate change). Furthermore, I am curious 
about the effects of religious language on left-wing folks and how it might also increase their 
support for these same issues.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
I begin my review by exploring the role religion plays in public opinion formation. While 
often conservatism and religiosity are conflated, scholars like Ariel Malka argue that the two are 
 
1 Michael Lipka, “U.S. religious groups and their political leanings,” pewresearch.org, Pew Research Center, 




not always linked. Here, Malka et al. evaluate the parameters of this relationship, finding that it 
is only present “among those who are relatively interested in and knowledgeable about politics.”2 
Thus, even when not accounting for differences in ethno-religious communities in the United 
States, Malka et al. show that religiosity merely strengthens beliefs rather than being the catalyst 
for their inception. Indeed, scholars like Zaller would likely conceptualize religiosity as an 
example of a political predisposition, which he argues mediates the relationship between elite 
information and public opinions.3 Other elements that factor into opinion formation, such as age, 
gender, education, and race will serve as controls in the regression models in my analyses. 
Moreover, Zaller asserts that many things over a person’s lifetime affect their predispositions, 
especially when they interact directly with the policies about which they form opinions.4 In fact, 
some scholarship suggests that religiosity’s effect may change over a person’s lifetime, a model 
that Margolis identifies as “the life-cycle theory of religious political attachments.”5 There, she 
argues that Americans abandon and then rediscover religion as their political ideologies 
stabilize.6 This idea – that religiosity intensifies existing beliefs – is incredibly relevant to my 
project, forming the basis of my hypotheses about the interaction between religiosity and partisan 
identity on these issues.  
The other major political predisposition discussed in this paper is partisan identity. 
Scholarship about climate change and vaccines suggests different partisan positions on each 
issue, which form the foundation of the base-hypothesis about these two subjects. I have elected 
 
2 Ariel Malka, Yphtach Lelkes, Sanjay Srivastava, Adam B. Cohen, and Dale T. Miller, “The Association of 
Religiosity and Political Conservatism: The Role of Political Engagement,” Political Psychology 33 no. 2 (2012): 
276.  
3 John R Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 23. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Michele F. Margolis, “How Politics Affects Religion: Partisanship, Socialization, and Religiosity in America,” The 
Journal of Politics 80 no. 1 (2017): 32.   
6 Ibid.  
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to begin with climate change, since that partisan divide appears to be more obvious. Indeed, 
scholars like Stefan Linde’s comparative analysis finds that support for different policies 
designed to mitigate the effects of climate change varies by political party.7 Consequently, in this 
paper, I found different outcomes for different policy-based questions among Republicans. 
Moreover, scholars like Deborah Lynn Guber apply Zaller’s model to climate change. She 
asserts that this divide among elite opinions disseminates into the masses, resulting in extreme 
polarization on the issue, even when applying the controls mentioned earlier.8 Together, these 
two sentiments about partisanship and climate change lead to The Partisan Climate Change 
Hypothesis, which I propose as: “Climate Change follows Partisan Identity.” While there may be 
variation in the support of different policies, ultimately, I expect the Republican position to be 
consistently less supportive than the Democratic one.  
This project also investigates vaccines as a comparison to climate change. When it comes 
to vaccines, it can be difficult to locate a partisan direction to the issue. Indeed, Anna Kirkland 
explains in her book that “...vaccines are ideologically cross-cutting…” arguing that those who 
oppose vaccines make up a broad coalition, rather than belonging to a single political party.9 She 
argues that this issue stands in stark contrast to climate change, thereby allowing for an apt 
comparison. I therefore submit The Non-Partisan Vaccine Hypothesis: “Opinions about vaccines 
will not correlate with political parties.” Here, I expect this hypothesis to hold both for beliefs 
about vaccines and autism as well as general concerns about vaccine safety and risks.  
 
7 Stefan Linde, Climate policy support under political consensus: exploring the varying effect of partisanship and 
party cues," Environmental Politics 27, no. 2 (2018): 233. 
8 Deborah Lynn Guber, “A Cooling Climate for Change? Party Polarization and the Politics of Global Warming,” 
American Behavioral Scientist 57, no. 1 (January 2013): 108.  
9 Anna Kirkland, Vaccine Court: The Law and Politics of Injury, (NYU Press, 2016), 37.  
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Now that I have proposed foundational hypotheses about the relationship between 
partisanship and each topic, a more in depth discussion of this complex relationship involving 
religiosity can be explored. Regarding climate change, some recent scholarship suggests that 
“religiosity was also positively and significantly related to concern for global warming…”10 
However, it should be noted that there is not consensus about the salience of religiosity in this 
literature (e.g., Rutjens et al., found that “religiosity played no meaningful role” in evaluating 
climate change skepticism.11) More specifically, Mostafa’s article also finds that “…religious 
participation fosters altruistic and pro-environmental behaviors.”12 Here, the religious beliefs in 
contrast with behaviors may produce different effects. Other scholars have emphasized the 
beliefs end of this spectrum as well as the role religious institutions might play in crafting future 
environmental policies since “people are typically more moved by faith than by other means.”13 
Thus, I still submit The Climate Change & Religiosity Hypothesis. Here, I assert that those with 
high levels of religiosity in either party will represent the extreme positions on the climate 
change issue. In other words, religious Republicans will be the strongest opponents of climate 
change policies, while religious Democrats will be the strongest supporters of these same 
policies. Here too, I also suggest the Vaccines & Religiosity Hypothesis. In the context of 
vaccines, I expect religiosity to have a similar radicalizing effect: those with the highest levels of 
religiosity will be at the extreme ends of the issue.   
 
10 Mohammed M. Mostafa, “Post-maternalism, Religiosity, Political Orientation, Locus of Control and Concern for 
Global Warming: A Multilevel Analysis Across 40 Nations,” Social Indicators Research 128 no. 3 (2016): 1286. 
11 Bastiaan T. Rutjens, Robbie M. Sutton, and Romy van der Lee, “Not All Skepticism is Equal: Exploring the 
Ideological Antecedents of Science Acceptance and Rejection,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 44, no. 
3 (2017): pp. 392. 
12 Mostafa, “Post-maternalism, Religiosity, Political Orientation,” 1291.  
13 Jay Squalli, “Is religiosity green in the United States?” Economic Analysis and Policy 63 (2019): 22. 
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In addition, the role age plays in levels of religiosity and political socialization presents a 
compelling alternative hypothesis. It could be said that people are more liberal and less religious 
when they are young, but conservative and more religious when they grow older. Thus, when 
exploring the public opinions of religious folks, it is necessary to account for differences in ages 
in respondents, and the controls in my models do so. Some scholarship also indicates that 
younger people are more concerned about economic policies rather than environmentalism.14 
However, these two issues are closely linked, as many of the policies designed to mitigate 
climate change would have direct effects on the economy. Moreover, given the activity of 
younger activists (especially in the past four years), I think there is good reason to re-evaluate 
this claim. 
Finally, I aim to test religiosity’s prevalence across party lines through a framing 
experiment. To answer this question, I apply literature on priming and the framing of survey 
questions. Here, a framing experiment using different language would allow me to reduce the 
impact of conflating variables to see the direct effect of the difference in language. In their 1990 
article, Kinder and Sanders explore the effects of different frames in survey questions. They 
explain how frames are sometimes used by elites to “alter how an issue is understood and, 
ultimately, what opinion turns out to be.”15 To put this concept in Zaller’s terms, by deliberately 
framing information about political issues, elites can affect which political predispositions an 
individual may call upon when deciding what to do with the new information presented. Here, 
my goal was to remind respondents about their religious identity and hopefully cause them to 
 
14 Tsimpo, Clarence Tsimpo, and Quentin Wodon, “Faith Affiliation, Religiosity, and Attitudes Towards the 
Environment and Climate Change,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 14, no. 4 (2016): 55.  
15 Donald R. Kinder, and Lynn M. Sanders, "Mimicking political debate with survey questions: The case of white 
opinion on affirmative action for blacks," Social cognition 8, no. 1 (1990): 74. 
6 
 
rely on that predisposition when answering the questions, thereby increasing support. In sum, I 
used their models of differently framed survey questions as a template and basis for constructing 
my own questions about climate change and vaccines.16 A closer examination of the specific 
language used appears in the following methods section.  
III. METHODS 
 My thesis incorporates data from three different datasets. The first two are American 
National Election Study (ANES) pilot data from 2018 and 2019 and the third is my own survey 
which I fielded through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk program.17 Included within this survey was 
a framing experiment around climate and vaccine issues. Each of these datasets have their own 
advantages and setbacks. For example, the 2018 ANES pilot has no questions about vaccines, 
but its section on climate change provides for a more robust measure of the concept. There are 
questions about the perceptions of different areas affected by climate change as well as the 
overall importance of the issue. In contrast, the 2019 ANES pilot dataset does have questions 
about both vaccines and climate change; however, the scales constructed from this dataset are 
rather limited. Here, there is only one question about vaccines, and it involves their relation to 
autism. While this is an important component of a vaccine scale, it should by no means be the 
only question generating the scale. Additionally, the questions about climate change produce a 
different scale than the 2018 data. Here, the questions involve specific hypothetical policy 
questions about fuel efficiency standards and government regulations. Neither ANES pilots have 
particularly robust measures of religiosity. In addition to denominations, their measures borrow 
Pew questions about the frequency of religious service attendance, the frequency of prayer, if the 
 
16 Kinder and Sanders, "Mimicking political debate with survey questions,” 78. 
17 IRB exemption status received on December 02, 2020.  
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respondent has had a born again experience, and their perceived importance of their religious 
identity. There are no questions about scripture, God, or other communal religious experiences, 
which I would argue could be just as important in constructing a religiosity scale. Therefore, in 
my own survey I did several things to address the problems I had with the ANES data.  
First, I combined several questions about climate change from the 2018 and 2019 ANES 
pilots, including the policy suggestions from the 2019 dataset, as well as more general questions 
about the effects of the climate crisis. Second, I added more questions about vaccines, including 
the overall importance of the issue and the perceived threat not being vaccinated causes the 
community. Third, I asked a series of questions to serve as “measures of religious belongings, 
belief, and behaviors (the Three Bs),” which are all necessary components in measuring 
religiosity.18 Here, I blended measures from multiple scholars. For example, McKenzie and 
Rouse combine measures about general feelings on a 6-point scale with belief in Biblical 
inerrancy and frequency of church attendance on a 5-point scale.19 In contrast, Kelly & Morgan 
measure religiosity through such variables as church attendance, prayer, Bible reading, authority 
of the Bible, importance of religion, and born-again experiences.20 Moreover, by expanding the 
definition of religiosity to include things beyond just denomination and church attendance, I 
hope to be more inclusive to non-Christian religions that might otherwise get overlooked. 
Furthermore, while religious denomination may appear to present an important difference in 
attitudes toward the environment, recent scholarship suggests that there is considerable overlap 
 
18 David L. Leal, Jerod Patterson, and Joe R. Tafoya, “Religion and the Political Engagement of Latino Immigrants: 
Bridging Capital or Segmented Religious Assimilation?” RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social 
Sciences 2 no. 3 (2016): 125.  
19 Brian D. McKenzie, and Stella M. Rouse, “Shades of Faith: Religious Foundations of Political Attitudes among 
African Americans, Latinos, and Whites,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 1 (2013): 224-225. 
20 Nathan J. Kelly, and Jana Morgan. “Religious Traditionalism and Latino Politics in the United States,” American 
Politics Research 36, no. 2 (2008): 244.  
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across faiths, necessitating a more robust measure than merely religious denominations.21 
Ultimately, I included four measures of beliefs and four measures of behaviors. Religious beliefs 
include beliefs about God, about scripture, about their perceived connectedness to their religious 
community, as well as the overall importance they place on their religion. Religious behaviors 
include, religious service attendance, time spent praying, time spent reading scripture, and time 
spent with one’s non-familial coreligionists. Together these eight questions were used to 
generate a very robust measure of religiosity. Here, I hope this robust measure of religiosity will 
more fully capture this concept. Further, the increased number of questions in the religiosity 
scale enables me to separate religious beliefs from behaviors to interrogate a potential different 
effect for each scale. The univariate results of both the M-Turk survey and the 2018 and 2019 
pilots can be viewed at the beginning of Section IV. Additionally, the full list of survey questions 
and responses is detailed below in Appendix I.  
However, there were also some drawbacks with the M-Turk dataset. Most importantly, 
the lack of a representative sample results in low levels of external validity for its multivariate 
analyses. Therefore, the primary function of the observational section of the M-Turk dataset will 
be to reinforce the findings of the ANES data. Nevertheless, since a major component of the 
survey involved testing a framing experiment, the sample size was maximized according to 
power calculations from both the 2018 and 2019 ANES pilot datasets. Based on the 2018 ANES 
data, a sample size of at least 344 would be needed to find a difference of 0.10 between two 
means of the Global Warming Scale (2018) at power level 0.80 and α = 0.05. In contrast, a 
difference of in means of the Global Warming Scale (2019) of 0.53 (and the same power and 
alpha) on the 2019 ANES dataset, would require a sample size of 366. Furthermore, when 
 
21 Squalli, 22. 
9 
 
assessing the Vaccines & Autism Scale (2019), I found a delta of -0.66 (and the same power and 
alpha as the other two calculations), required a dataset with a samples size of 358. Using these 
power calculations along with the price estimate of Amazon’s M-Turk workers, a sample size of 
360 was determined for my survey.  
The aim of this experiment was to see if respondents’ religiosity could be primed in a 
way to show support for climate change policies or vaccines. In the first round of the experiment, 
respondents were randomly split into two groups. One group received a question about the 
importance of being vaccinated with a religious frame, while the other group received the same 
question in isolation. Below is an example of the religious language used in the vaccines 
experiment: 
Some people say they have a moral obligation to value life, health, and the prevention of 
suffering (particularly of children and other innocents) through vaccinations. Other 
people believe that getting vaccinated is ineffective at accomplishing this goal.  
To what extent would you say it is important to get vaccinated?  
Similarly, in the Climate Change round of the experiment, respondents were again divided into 
two groups. The first received a question about climate change framed by religious language, and 
the second group received the same question with no frame at all. Below is the religious 
language used in the Climate Change experiment:  
Some people think humanity are stewards of the environment and we have a moral 
responsibility to address global warming, by protecting our Earth and all of Creation. 
Others think the Earth was given to humanity to do with as we please.  
To what extent should we be supporting government action to slow the Earth's warming?  
10 
 
In both cases, I was careful to ensure that the religious appeals appear as non-
denominational as possible. While the ideas presented in the religious frames do involve values 
that are implicitly Christian, my goal with this language was to erase explicit appeals to a 
particular branch of Christianity from the text. For example, The Center for Progressive 
Christianity’s 8 points of Progressive Christianity lists number 7 as “[W]e are Christians who… 
strive to protect and restore the integrity of our Earth.”22 In my survey, I opted to use this same 
language without the explicit mention of Christianity, to achieve the widest appeal possible. In 
contrast, Campbell et al.’s religiosity framing experiment uses the same language in the 
“Moderate Religion” category as the “No Religion” category when addressing political issues, 
(e.g., policies involving the LGBTQ+ community).23 Moreover, their experiment had a third 
group of “High Religion,” which contained explicitly Christian appeals in these policy 
descriptions.24 However, since my aim was to reach the most people with the appeal (and I could 
not afford to have three groups), I opted to keep the language as non-denominational as possible. 
In hindsight, it may have been beneficial to preserve the explicitly Christian language but 
combine it with a more complex sampling procedure that prioritizes those with salient Christian 
identities.   
There were four groups of respondents in my experiments. The first group consists of 
those who received both religious language treatments. The second one was made up of those 
who received the religious language around vaccines, but not for climate change. The third group 
had no religious language around vaccines, but they did have it for climate change. Finally, the 
 
22 “The 8 Points of Progressive Christianity,” ProgressiveChristianity.org, accessed October 20, 2020 
https://progressivechristianity.org/the-8-points/.  
23 David E. Campbell, Geoffrey C. Layman, John C. Green, and Nathanael G. Sumaktoyo, "Putting politics first: 
The impact of politics on American religious and secular orientations," American Journal of Political Science 62, 




fourth group received no religious language on either question. Theoretically, there are questions 
about the effect of the religious language on members of group two. Since their religiosity has 
already been primed with the vaccines question, it stands to reason that it will remain salient for 
them, leading them to use it in assessing the climate change question. However, since the general 
questions about vaccines will function as a buffer, there is less of a concern.25 
Here, due to the random assignment of respondents to each group, the experiment can be 
used as a means of testing the causality of the religious frame. Since respondents did not choose 
their groups, the experimental data should allow me to study the isolated influence of religiosity. 
In contrast, the observational data cannot as easily show a causative effect of religiosity on the 
respondents’ answers. There, the results illustrate correlation, but not causation.  
 For both vaccines and climate change, I hypothesize the following about the frame:  
1. The religious language will be effective at raising respondents’ scores on both issues. 
2. Democrats and Republicans will be affected differently by religious frames. Democrats 
will display higher scores with the religious frame, but Republicans will score lower with 
those same frames.  
3. There will be a difference in the effectiveness of the frame across three different levels of 
religiosity, with those in the middle being the most affected.  
4. There will also be a difference in the effectiveness of the frame across the different levels 
of importance respondents ascribe to the issues. Here again, those who assign a middling 
level of importance to the issue will be most affected by the frame.  
  
 
25 Here, the effects of having these two experiments back to back are explored further in Table 20a and Table 20b 





 Here, this section of the data analysis opens with some numerical and graphical displays 
of the key variables used in the analysis as they appear in each of the data sets used in this thesis. 
First, I explore partisan identity, then measures of religiosity, and finally, the different scales 
used to measure support for climate change policies as well as vaccines.26  
Partisan Identity:  
Dataset Democrats Republicans Independents Others (No Party) 
2018 ANES 870 (37.02%) 627 (26.68%) 781 (33.23%) 72 (3.06%) 
2019 ANES 999 (33.28%) 862 (28.71%) 987 (32.88%) 154 (5.13%) 
2020 M-Turk 172 (49.00%) 106 (30.20%) 73 (20.80%)  
 
Although there is considerable variation across datasets, there is still some strong overlap. 
Most prominently between the 2018 and 2019 ANES pilots, which consist of nationally 
representative samples. In contrast, the 2020 M-Turk data has less external validity. Here, the 
biggest issue is the over representation of Democrats at almost 50%. Nevertheless, the 
percentage of Republicans remains relatively close to the proportion present in other datasets. 
Also, the relatively smaller number of independents will make any conclusions about that group 
from the 2020 data difficult.  
In the 2018 ANES pilot dataset, there were originally 857 Democrats. However, there 
were also 13 individuals who listed other left-wing parties including but not limited to 
“democratic socialist” or “liberal”. These folks were then up-coded into the category of 
 
26 In multiple instances, the way I combined variables resulted in lopsided scales, especially for the 2020 M-Turk 
dataset (e.g., the 2020 Global Warming Scale runs from -3 to 5). In the context of future research projects, I intend 
to combine these scales in a different way, so as to decrease this lopsidedness.  
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Democrats, resulting in the final number of 870. Similarly, the initial Republican count was 609. 
However, there were also several individuals who listed other right-wing parties, including but 
not limited to “conservative” or “libertarian” that were up-coded into Republican. The final tally 
of Republicans thus became 627. Finally, Independents started out with 767 cases. However, like 
with the Democrats and Republicans before them, some folks expressed centrist ideologies, such 
as “between republican and democrat” or “neutral.” These centrist cases were up-coded, to give 
us a total of 781 Independents. The final 72 cases (reduced from 117) were individuals who 
express affiliation for no political party at all or were in other ways in direct opposition to 
American politics (e.g., “Don’t vote” or “nothing”).  
In the 2019 ANES pilot data, there was a similar process to the 2018 data of up-coding. 
Here, when respondents reported to be “democratic socialists”, it was added to the Democrat 
category. Similarly, respondents who answered things like “conservative” or “libertarian” were 
added to the Republican category. In addition, I constructed a continuous 7 point partisan 
identity scale using the 2019 ANES pilot data.  
 
Finally, within the 2020 M-Turk dataset, there was no free-response option on the partisan 
identity question. Thus, there was no possibility for up-coding respondents into each category. 
Dataset Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 








2018 ANES Pilot Data: 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Attendance 2,426 1.37 1.17 0 3  
Prayer 2,408 3.23 2.40 0 6  
Importance 2,497 1.71 1.18 0 3  
Overall Religiosity 2,374 6.74 4.71 0 14 0.8671 
Here, the attendance variable initially had values ranging from 0 to 5, with different 
levels including: “Never Attends” (0), “Seldom Attends” (1), “A Few Times a Year” (2), “Once 
or Twice a Month” (3), “Once a Week” (4), “More Than Once a Week” (5). Nevertheless, after 
comparing each level’s mean score on the Global Warming Scale (2018), I elected to collapse 
the variable, by combining levels 2 & 3 as well as 4 & 5. However, when I combined it with the 
Figure 1: Religiosity Scale (2018) 
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other variables to create “Overall Religiosity” I was careful to use the original 6-point scale. 
Moreover, the addition of the born-again question resulted in a lower alpha score (α = 0.8450, 
compared with 0.8671), so it was not added to the rest of the measures in creating the religiosity 
scale. Of the 2,500 sampled 685 expressed having a born again experience (about 27%).  
2019 ANES Pilot Data: 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Attendance 3,162 1.53 2.07 0 6  
Prayer 3,037 3.24 2.41 0 6  
Importance 3,165 1.75 1.19 0 3  
Overall Religiosity 3,034 6.85 5.17 0 16 0.8269 
 In addition to these measures of religiosity, 922 respondents out of 3,164 (about 29%) 
reported having a born-again experience. Unlike with the 2018 ANES dataset, here, the addition 
of the born-again variable to the religiosity scale did not yield a lower alpha. Thus, it was 
Figure 2: Religiosity Scale (2019) 
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retained. Additionally, the histogram above (Figure 2), helps to illustrate how this dataset’s 
religiosity distribution has a very similar shape to the 2018 dataset (Figure 1). 
2020 M-Turk Dataset:  
Dataset Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Overall Religiosity 352 3.86 2.69 -1 8 0.9071 
Religious Beliefs 352 1.90 1.43 -1 4 0.8968 
Religious Behaviors 356 1.97 1.38 0 4 0.7581 
Here is a histogram of the Religiosity Scale in the 2020 M-Turk dataset (Figure 3). The scale is 
constructed from 8 questions (four belief questions and four behavior questions), yielding a 
Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.9071. 




Figure 4: Religious Beliefs & Behaviors Scale (2020) 
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These two histograms show the distribution of the Religious Beliefs scale as well as the 
Religious Behavior scale constructed from the 2020 M-Turk dataset (Figure 4). Here, the 
Religious Beliefs scale is constructed from 4 questions: respondents’ beliefs about God, their 
beliefs about the holy text of their religion, the level of importance they ascribe to their religious 
identity, and the amount they feel like their true self around their coreligionists. The combined 
measures yield a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.8968. The Religious Behavior scale is likewise 
constructed from 4 questions: the frequency of respondent’s religious service attendance, the 
frequency they engage in personal prayer, the amount of time they spend reading scripture, and 
the amount of time they spend with members of the same religion (outside of family). The 




Global Warming Scales: 
Dataset Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
2018 ANES 2,496 10.99 5.11 2 18 0.9143 
2019 ANES 3,151 0.98 1.81 -3 3 0.8319 
2020 M-Turk 328 3.15 1.70 -3 5 0.8044 
Here in the 2018 ANES pilot data, the Global Warming Scale (2018) is constructed from 
questions about the causes of global warming, the amount the government should do about it, the 
amount global warming affects weather patterns in the United States, the amount global warming 
affects weather patterns in one’s local community, and the level of importance of the issue. The 
combined measure yields a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.9143.   
Figure 5: Global Warming Scale (2018) 
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Dataset Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
2018 ANES 2,496 10.99 5.11 2 18 0.9143 
2019 ANES 3,151 0.98 1.81 -3 3 0.8319 
2020 M-Turk 328 3.15 1.70 -3 5 0.8044 
Here in the 2019 ANES pilot data, the Global Warming Scale (2019) is constructed from 
respondent’s support or opposition to two hypothetical policies to combat climate change as well 
as respondent’s confidence in their belief (or disbelief) in the warming tempature of the planet. 
The two policies are: 1) increased government regulation on businesses that produce a great deal 
of greenhouse emissions linked to climate change, and 2) higher fuel efficiency standards for 
cars and trucks. The combined measure yields a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.8319. 
Figure 6: Global Warming Scale (2019) 
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Dataset Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
2018 ANES 2,496 10.99 5.11 2 18 0.9143 
2019 ANES 3,151 0.98 1.81 -3 3 0.8319 
2020 M-Turk 328 3.15 1.70 -3 5 0.8044 
Here in the 2020 M-Turk data, the Global Warming Scale (2020) is constructed from questions 
about the causes of global warming, and the level of importance of the issue, as well as 
respondent’s support or opposition to two hypothetical policies to combat climate change. These 
two policies are the same as those proposed in the 2019 ANES pilot. Here, the Cronbach’s alpha 
score was 0.8044. Here, the 2020 Global Warming scale distribution mirrors the 2019 scale due 
to the number of overlapping questions.  




Dataset Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
2019 ANES 3,137 -2.17 2.22 -4 4  
2020 M-Turk 357 2.35 1.11 -1 4 0.6555 
In the 2019 ANES pilot data, the Vaccines Scale represents the respondents’ belief (or 
disbelief) in the link between vaccines and autism. Here is how I constructed the scale: An initial 
question asked respondents if they thought there was a link between vaccines and autism. Next, 
respondents were asked to rank the level of confidence they associated with their previous 
answer. I then multiplied the two results. Thus, a high negative score reflects confidence in the 
lack of association of vaccines and autism, whereas a high positive score corresponds to 
someone who is very confident in a link between vaccines and autism. Since very few 
respondents ended up with positive scores on this Vaccines Scale, Figure 8 on the next page 
illustrates a heavy skew of the distribution in the negative direction. As a result of this skew, the 
differences I explore will be in how confident a person is that vaccines do not cause autism.  
In contrast, the 2020 M-Turk dataset, contains multiple measures of vaccines to construct 
that scale. Here, the vaccine scale contains questions about the importance of being vaccinated, 
the potential risks to the community when someone is not vaccinated, the possibility of a link 
between vaccines and autism, and the personal level of importance of the issue to the respondent. 
Additionally, the belief in vaccines causing autism is coded in the opposite direction from the 
2019 dataset. This way, all the pro-vaccine policy preferences end up on the same side of the 




Figure 8: Vaccines & Autism Scale (2019) 




 Before assessing religiosity’s connection with partisan perspectives on science-based 
issues, it is first necessary to explore that partisan relationship in its own terms. I begin the 
analyses with climate change opinions, which are described in the Partisan Climate Change 
Hypothesis:  
Climate Change follows Partisan Identity; Republicans will score lower than Democrats 
on Global Warming Scales. 
Below is a table of each group’s mean score on the Global Warming Scale (2018) as well as the 
results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis between party affiliation and perception 
of the effects of global warming:   
Table 1: Mean Scores on the Global Warming Scale by Party (ANES 2018) 
 
Table 1a: Support for Global Warming Policies by Party Affiliation (ANES 2018) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.05  * p < 0.10 
N(df) = 2,346 (2,342); Adjusted R2 = 0.3253; P > F = 0.0000  
Support for Global 
Warming Polices 
Observations Mean (Standard Error) 95% Confidence Interval 
Democrats 870 14.22 (0.12) (13.99, 14.45) 
Republicans 627 6.68 (0.17) (6.36, 7.01) 
Independents 781 10.90 (0.18) (10.55, 11.25) 
Other (No Party) 72 10.38 (0.64) (9.12, 11.63) 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Republican -7.54 (0.22) -33.64 0.000*** (-7.98, -0.71) 
Independent -3.32 (0.21) -15.75 0.000*** (-3.73, -2.90) 
Other (No Party) -3.85 (0.52) -7.34 0.000*** (-4.87, 2.82) 
Intercept (Democrats) 14.22 (0.15) 98.16 0.000*** (13.94, 14.50) 
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The Global Warming Scale used in this model runs from 2 to 18 and reflects the global warming 
impact they perceive and their opinions about the amount the government should do to combat 
these forces. Here, Democrats are shown to have the highest scores on the Global Warming 
Scale (2018). In contrast, Republicans score about -7.5 points lower than Democrats; 
Independents score about -3.3 points lower than Democrats; and those without a party score -3.8 
less than Democrats. Each of these differences carry statistical significance (p = 0.000), 
indicating strong evidence in support of a real difference in climate change opinions between 
parties. Moreover, the distribution illustrated in these histograms show how Republican opinion 
of climate change runs counter to Democrat opinions on the same issue. However, later, when 
questions orient respondents toward specific policies, the Republican distribution shifts to be 
more centered.  




This effect is also apparent when coding party affiliation as a continuous scale, which 
runs from strong Republican (-3) to strong Democrat (+3).  
Table 2: Support for Global Warming Policies by Strength of Party Affiliation (ANES 2019) 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Party Affiliation Scale 0.46 (0.01) 36.70 0.000*** (0.44, 0.49) 
Intercept 0.31 (0.01) 33.99 0.000*** (0.29, 0.33) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 3,036 (3,034); Adjusted R2 = 0.3072; P > F = 0.0000 
The relationship here is also statistically significant (p = 0.000), and positive, meaning as a 
person’s party affiliation moves in the direction of strong Democrat, the more likely they are to 
support specific policies designed to combat global warming. The key distinction here being that 
the 2019 ANES Global Warming Scale (2019) references two policies designed to accomplish 
Figure 9: Democrat GWS Score (2018) 
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this goal. The two policy proposals are increased government regulations and higher efficiency 
standards for motor vehicles. Another distinguishing factor of this measure is the scale running 
from -3 to +3. Here, there is an opportunity for respondents to voice their opposition to each 
policy, rather than merely a lack of support for it.  
Below is a table of mean Global Warming Scores (2019) by Party Affiliation in the 2019 
ANES data. 
Table 2a: Mean Scores on the Global Warming Scale by Party (ANES 2019) 
Support for Global 
Warming Polices 
Observations Mean (Standard Error) 95% Confidence Interval 
Democrats 999 2.11 (0.04) (2.04, 2.19) 
Republicans 862 -0.10 (0.06) (-0.21, 0.02) 
Independents 987 0.95 (0.06) (0.84, 1.07) 
Other (No Party) 154 0.30 (0.18) (-0.05, 0.65) 
Much like the 2018 data, when conducting regression analysis, Democrats were found to score 
the highest. In contrast to the previous dataset where Republicans could only express a lack of 
belief in the impacts of climate change on their country and community, here they can voice 
direct opposition to specific policies (e.g., regulations and efficiency standards). Here, the table 
illustrates only weaker support for those policies, rather than direct opposition to them. In fact, 
the 95 percent confidence interval implies that the mean could be as high as 0.02. Indeed, while 
the distribution of the scores for Democrats and Republicans skew in opposite directions (see 
histograms on the next page), the skew is much weaker for the Republicans. There, the data 
appear to be nearly normally distributed about the 0, with most of the cases scoring 1 or less. 
Thus, while there is still a clear difference in the opinions of members of different political 
28 
 
parties, it is not entirely apparent that Republicans strongly oppose these policies in a way that 
parallels Democratic support for them.  
 Figure 10: Republican GWS Score (2019) 
Figure 11: Democrat GWS Score (2019) 
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Table 2b: Support for Global Warming Policies by Party Affiliation (ANES 2019) 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Republicans -2.21 (0.07) -29.72 0.000*** (-2.36, -2.07) 
Independents -1.16 (0.07) -16.12 0.000*** (-1.30, -1.02) 
Other (No Party) -1.81 (0.14) -13.07 0.000*** (-2.09, -1.54) 
Intercept (Democrats 2.11 (0.05) 41.69 0.000*** (2.01, 2.21) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 2,989 (2,985); Adjusted R2 = 0.2347; P > F = 0.000 
Here, in the 2019 ANES dataset, I was able to effectively replicate the 2018 ANES results. Each 
other group (Republicans, Independents, and those without a party) scored lower than 
Democrats, each supported by strong statistical evidence (p = 0.000).   
Finally, I will attempt to replicate these results a third time using the M-Turk survey data. 
Here, the Global Warming Scale (2020) score was constructed through a combination of 
questions from the 2018 and 2019 ANES pilot datasets. Thus, there are questions both about the 
general impact of global warming felt by individuals as well as questions about specific policy 
preferences, yielding a scale that runs from -3 to 5. The table below describes the mean score by 
party affiliation as well as a boxplot describing the distribution of the data in each party:  
Table 3: Mean Scores on the Global Warming Scale by Party (M-Turk 2020) 
Support for Global 
Warming Polices 
Observations Mean (Standard Error) 95% Confidence Interval 
Democrats 172 3.60 (0.12) (3.37, 3.83) 
Republicans 106 2.38 (0.19) (2.01, 2.76) 




Here again, like in the 2018 and 2019 ANES pilot datasets, the Democrat’s average score was 
the highest, followed by Independents, and finally Republicans. Additionally, like in the 2019 
ANES dataset, the lower Republican score translates to a lack of support – rather than direct 
opposition to – the proposed policies.  
 Furthermore, the regression table below also confirms the results of the 2018 ANES and 
2019 ANES data, with Republicans yielding a negative, statistically significant (p = 0.000) 
coefficient. In contrast to the other datasets, there is slightly less evidence suggesting 
Independents are any different than Democrats (p = 0.043). These results would place 
Independents in between Republicans and Democrats on the Global Warming Scale (2020) 
(albeit with a little less certainty than in other datasets). Additionally, the similarities here 
between these results and the previously explored ones helps affirm my confidence about the 
quality of the sample and the responses in this dataset.  
Figure 12: GWS by Party (2020) 
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Table 3a: Support for Global Warming Policies by Party Affiliation (M-Turk 2020) 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Republicans -1.22 (0.21) -5.84 0.000*** (-1.63, -0.81) 
Independents -0.48 (0.23) -2.04 0.043** (-0.93, -0.02) 
Intercept (Democrats) 3.60 (0.13) 27.94 0.000*** (3.35, 3.86) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.05  * p < 0.10 
N(df) = 323 (320); Adjusted R2 = 0.0906; P > F = 0.000 
 In sum, there is strong evidence in suggesting that public opinion on climate change 
follows partisan identity, thus supporting the Partisan Climate Change Hypothesis. Moreover, 
Democrats tend to support policies designed to combat Climate Change, whereas there is more 
variation in Republican opinion of these policies, despite a lack of support for the issue itself. 
While this hypothesis and finding may seem obvious, it provides a necessary foundation and 
starting point before examining more complex hypotheses.  
 Next, I move to examine public opinion on vaccines and its relationship with partisan 
identity. In contrast to climate change opinions, I hypothesized the Non-Partisan Vaccines 
Hypothesis which states:  
Opinions about vaccines will not correlate with political parties. 
Before describing the findings related to this hypothesis, it is important to first note that the two 
data sets (2019 ANES and 2020 M-Turk) focus on different aspects of vaccines as a political 
issue. The 2019 ANES data focuses exclusively on the belief that vaccines are somehow linked 
with autism, whereas the 2020 M-Turk vaccines scale contains other questions about vaccines.  
 Below is a table showing the mean vaccine & autism score from the 2019 ANES pilot 
study as well as a boxplot showing the distribution of the data by party.  
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Mean (Standard Error) 95% Confidence Interval 
Democrats 999 -2.56 (0.07) (-2.69, -2.43) 
Republicans 862 -1.90 (0.08) (-2.05, -1.74) 
Independents 987 -2.18 (0.07) (-2.32, -2.04) 
Other (No Party) 154 -2.13 (0.18) (-2.49, -1.77) 
 
Here, the data show that most folks, across each party, do not believe there is a link between 
vaccines and autism. The difference in opinion has more to do with the respondent’s confidence 
in their answer. Democrats appear to be more confident that there is no association between 
vaccines and autism, but Republicans and other groups are a little less confident that there is no 
relationship there.  
Figure 13: Vaccines & Autism by Party (2019) 
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 Below are regression tables showing the difference in vaccine and autism beliefs by party 
identity. The first model has party affiliation coded as a categorical variable, and the second one 
uses a continuous scale.  
Table 4a: Vaccines & Autism by Party Affiliation (ANES 2019) 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Republican 0.66 (0.10) 6.47 0.000*** (0.46, 0.86) 
Independent 0.38 (0.10) 3.84 0.000*** (0.19, 0.57) 
Other (No Party) 0.43 (0.19) 2.24 0.025** (0.06, 0.81) 
Intercept (Democrats) -2.56 (0.07) -36.75 0.000*** (-2.70, -2.42) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 2,974 (2,970); Adjusted R2 = 0.0134; P > F = 0.000 
 
Table 4b: Vaccines & Autism by Strength of Party Affiliation (ANES 2019) 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Party Affiliation Scale -0.15 (0.02) -8.47 0.000*** (-0.19, -0.12) 
Intercept -2.19 (0.04) -54.85 0.000*** (-2.26, -2.11) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 3,021 (3,019); Adjusted R2 = 0.0229; P > F = 0.000 
Here, Republicans are significantly less likely to be confident that there is no link between 
vaccines and autism (p = 0.000). This effect is about half for Independents with the same level of 
significance (p= 0.000), and a little less significant for those with no Political Party (p = 0.025). 
These partisan distinctions also maintain their significance and direction when introducing 
controls for race, education, age, and gender into the model. Since these results show partisan 
differences in public opinion of vaccines, they would appear to contradict my Non-Partisan 
Vaccines Hypothesis. However, these results may be symptomatic of something else going on 
with Republicans, given that these questions come from a section on misinformation in the 2019 
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ANES pilot. It is possible that these findings indicate Republicans are more exposed to 
pseudoscience than their Democrat peers, rather than just their beliefs about vaccines and autism. 
However, this assertion requires evidence beyond the scope of this paper. 
For a more robust vaccines scale, I now turn to the 2020 M-Turk data. There, the 
vaccines scale runs from -1 to 4. These questions ask about vaccines in a more general sense (as 
well as their potential connection with autism). In this scale, those who scored the highest did not 
believe in a link between vaccines & autism, expressed concern for the threat to the community 
posed by not being vaccinated, and reported the issue as one of personal importance to them. 
Below, the table describes the mean vaccine scores in each political party. 
Table 5: Mean Vaccine Score by Political Affiliation (M-Turk 2020) 
Vaccines Observations Mean (Standard 
Error) 
95% Confidence Interval 
Democrats 172 2.54 (0.09) (2.37, 2.71) 
Republicans 106 2.01 (0.09) (1.83, 2.19) 
Independents 73 2.32 (0.14) (2.05, 2.58) 
Here, much like the 2019 ANES dataset, both Republicans and Democrats have mean scores that 
place them on the pro-science side of the scale. Each party’s mean scores about vaccines in that 
dataset showed them to not think vaccines are linked with autism. The variation was linked to 
their relative confidence in their thoughts on that relationship, rather than whether they thought it 
exists or it does not. Here too, Republicans – while still scoring lower than the Democrats or 
Independents – are not receiving extremely low scores (or even negative ones). The distributions 




Here again, Democrats scored highest, followed by independents, and then finally by 
Republicans, who appear to have the smallest distribution of all three groups. Indeed, the 
ordinary least squares regression table below shows strong evidence that Republicans score 
lower than Democrats on the vaccines scale (p = 0.000).  
Table 5a: Vaccines Score by Party Affiliation (M-Turk 2020) 
Vaccines Coefficients 
(Standard Error) 
t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Republicans -0.53 (0.13) -3.94 0.000*** (-0.79, -0.27) 
Independents -0.22 (0.15) -1.47 0.142 (-0.52, 0.08) 
Intercept (Democrats) 2.54 (0.08) 30.59 0.000*** (2.38, 2.70) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 350 (347); Adjusted R2 = 0.0208; P > F = 0.0152 
  




 In sum, there appears to be pretty strong evidence against the claim that there is no 
association between opinions about vaccines and partisan identity. Thus, there appears to be little 
support for my Non-Partisan Vaccines Hypothesis.  
Before going on to the next section which deals with religiosity, I think it is prudent to 
recap what I have found so far. First, I found strong support for the Partisan Climate Change 
Hypothesis, albeit with different distributions in the Republican party depending on the 
questions. Generally, I found that specific policies tend to be not supported, rather than directly 
opposed by Republicans. Second, models from both the 2019 ANES and 2020 M-Turk dataset 
showed evidence that contradicts the Non-Partisan Vaccines Hypothesis. The 2019 ANES 
dataset suggests that Republicans were less confident in there being no link between vaccines 
and autism than their Democratic counterparts. Moreover, in the 2020 M-Turk dataset, 
Republicans had the lowest mean vaccines scores when compared with Democrats and 
Independents. Below is a summary of the hypothesis in a table form:  
 
In the next few pages, I explore the association between religiosity and each of these 
issues. The distributions and scale construction of the religiosity variables are described in the 




“Climate Change follows 
Partisan Identity; Republicans 
will score lower than Democrats 
on Global Warming Scales.” 
I found strong evidence supporting this 
hypothesis. Republicans scored lower 
than Democrats on Global Warming 
Scales across three datasets (p = 0.000). 
 




“Opinions about vaccines will 
not correlate with political 
parties.” 
I found strong evidence against this 
hypothesis. Republicans tended to score 
lower on Vaccine Scales across both 
datasets (p = 0.000).  
 
See Tables 4-5a 
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Descriptive Analyses section (see pages 14-18). In the next few sections, I will explore the 2018 
& 2019 ANES Religiosity Scales effects both as continuous and broken up into categorical 
variables in the models. The 2020 M-Turk Religiosity Scale is comprised of both a belief and a 
behavior component; thus, it will be evaluated first holistically, and then as separate scales.  
I begin this section of analysis by examining the association between climate change and 
religiosity. The first model uses the data from the 2018 ANES pilot:  
Table 6: Global Warming Scores by Religiosity (Continuous) (ANES 2018) 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Religiosity -0.30 (0.02) -14.07 0.000*** (-0.35, -0.26) 
Intercept 13.07 (0.18) 73.55 0.000*** (12.72, 13.41) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 2,371 (2,369); Adjusted R2 = 0.0767; P > F = 0.000 
Here, there is a significant negative effect of religiosity on opinions about the effects of climate 
change. However, I am curious if the effect of religiosity could be modeled non-linearly. I 
suspect that the difference between cases is not uniformly distributed throughout the variable. 
Indeed, a categorical regression model with religiosity revealed less significance for the 
relationship in the lower levels of the variable, with some levels displaying no significance at all 
(p = 0.158). Thus, I decided to collapse the variable into four levels. The means of each group 
are displayed in the table below and the regression model using this categorical variable shown 




Table 6a: Mean Global Warming Scores by Religiosity (Categorical) (ANES 2018) 
Religiosity Levels: (0-14) Observations Mean 
(Standard 
Error) 
95% Confidence Interval 
Low Religiosity (0-2) 642 12.94 (0.18) (12.57, 13.30) 
Some Religiosity (3-6) 460 11.49 (0.23) (11.04, 11.93) 
More Religiosity (7-10) 635 10.47 (0.20) (10.70, 11.58) 
Most Religiosity (11-14) 637 9.30 (0.21) (8.73, 9.56) 
 
Table 6b: Global Warming Scores by Religiosity (Categorical) (ANES 2018) 





t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Some Religiosity (3-6) -1.47 (0.30) -4.77 0.000*** (-2.05, -0.85) 
More Religiosity (7-10) -2.47 (0.28) -8.87 0.000*** (-3.02, -1.92) 
Most Religiosity (11-14) -3.64 (0.27) -13.08 0.000*** (-4.19, -3.09) 
Intercept (Low Religiosity) 12.94 (0.19) 65.90 0.000*** (12.55, 13.32) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 2,371 (2,367); Adjusted R2 = 0.0708; P > F = 0.000 
 
Here, there is still a nearly linear distribution in the model, albeit with larger differences between 
the groups than what was previously shown in the last model. These larger groups allow for 
clearer distinctions between the levels of religiosity and their respective effects on climate 
change opinions. In both cases, an increase in religiosity is associated with a decrease in opinions 
about the impacts of global warming (p = 0.000). These folks who attend religious services often 
are less likely to think that the effects of climate change are present in their community (or the 
country at large) and that the government does not need to do more to combat its effects. 
Moreover, the effects of religiosity on global warming opinions remains significant even when 
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controlling for the age of the respondent. Furthermore, I find no evidence of an interaction 
between age and religiosity on climate change opinions (p > 0.100).   
 I find similar results in the 2019 ANES pilot data. Again, there is a negative correlation 
between religiosity and attitudes about climate change policies.  
Table 7: Global Warming Scores by Religiosity (Continuous) (ANES 2019) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 3,022 (3,020); Adjusted R2 = 0.1005; P > F = 0.0000 
 
However, much like in the 2018 ANES dataset, I am curious about the linearity of this model. 
An examination of the mean Global Warming Score (2019) at each of the 17 levels of religiosity 
in the 2019 ANES dataset revealed a larger difference between those with the highest levels of 
religiosity and the group proceeding them. Moreover, there were also smaller differences in the 
middle groups, as well as larger ones in the lowest categories. The religiosity variable was then 
collapsed into 4 categories (based on Global Warming Scores) to aid in the creation of these 
models. Here is a table of the means and below is a regression table with the collapsed 
categorical variable.  
  




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Religiosity (Continuous) -0.11 (0.01) -18.40 0.000*** (-1.22, -0.10) 
Intercept 1.76 (0.05) 33.92 0.000*** (1.67, 1.86) 
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Table 7a: Mean Global Warming Scores by Religiosity (Categorical) (ANES 2019) 
Note how the confidence interval of the “Most Religiosity” group crosses the 0. Here, (like with 
the Republicans in this dataset) it looks like this group is merely displaying a lack of support for 
these policies rather than direct opposition to them.   
Table 7b: Global Warming Scores by Religious Service Attendance (Categorical) (ANES 2019) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 3,022 (3,018); Adjusted R2 = 0.1093; P > F = 0.000 
 
Additionally, this regression model illustrates the non-linearity of the model. The difference 
between the coefficients of the “More” and “Most” group (0.78) appears to be nearly twice the 
difference between the “Some” and “More” groups (0.34). Moreover, the difference between the 
“Low” group and the “Some” group is even greater (1.10), further emphasizing this lack of 
linearity. In sum, religiosity’s effect appears to decrease support for specific policies. This effect 
is not constant throughout the model. It appears largest for folks with lower levels of religiosity, 
next largest for the folks with the most religiosity, but those with medium levels appear to 
Levels of Religiosity (0-16) Observations Mean (Standard 
Error) 
95% Confidence Interval 
Low Religiosity (0-1) 697 1.89 (0.06) (1.77, 1.99) 
Some Religiosity (2-7) 952 1.09 (0.06) (0.98, 1.20) 
More Religiosity (8-13) 933 0.74 (0.06) (0.63, 0.86) 
Most Religiosity (14-16) 452 -0.04 (0.09) (-0.21, 0.14) 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Some Religiosity (2-7) -0.79 (0.09) -9.26 0.000*** (-0.96, -0.62) 
More Religiosity (8-13) -1.13 (0.09) -13.24 0.000*** (-1.30, -0.97) 
Most Religiosity (14-16) -1.91 (0.10) -18.55 0.000*** (-2.12, -1.71) 
Intercept (Low Religiosity) 1.89 (0.06) 29.00 0.000*** (1.75, 2.01) 
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experience the smallest effect. When controlling for age in this model, the overall effect of 
religiosity was maintained, despite age being significant and negative.  
 Next, I examine the M-Turk 2020 data. Here, a regression model with religiosity and 
support for global warming policies yielded a significant negative association (p = 0.000). Here, 
the scale mainly consists of policy questions and the overall importance of fighting the effects of 
the changing climate. In other words, a high score on the religiosity scale is associated with 
lower levels of support for global warming policies, like increased regulations and higher fuel 
efficiency standards.  
Table 8: Global Warming Scores by Religiosity (M-Turk 2020) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 325 (323); Adjusted R2 = 0.0472; P > F = 0.0000 
 
However, since that dataset has a more robust definition of religiosity than the ANES data, it is 
prudent to explore any potential differences religious beliefs and behaviors may have on attitudes 
about increasing fuel efficiency standards and government regulations as well as the overall 
significance of the climate crisis to the respondent. Here, religious beliefs include belief in God, 
beliefs about scripture, feelings about coreligionists, and the overall importance of religion to the 
respondent. In contrast, religious behaviors refer to service attendance, frequency of prayer, time 
spent reading scripture, and amount of time spent with non-familial coreligionists.  
  




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Religiosity -0.14 (0.03) -4.13 0.000*** (-0.20, -0.07) 
Intercept 3.70 (0.16) 23.68 0.000*** (3.39, 4.01) 
42 
 
Table 8a: Global Warming Scores by Religious Beliefs vs Behaviors (M-Turk 2020) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 325 (322); Adjusted R2 = 0.0472; P > F = 0.0002 
 
Here, there is evidence that the religious beliefs scale and religious behaviors scale are 
measuring the same underlying concept. In fact, when separated (but still in the same model), 
only beliefs are significant (p = 0.031), whereas behaviors are not (p = 0.850). In contrast, when 
run in their own models, each variable retains its significance (p = 0.000 and 0.001, 
respectively). Since beliefs and behaviors measure the same concept, little significance is given 
to behaviors when put in a model together with beliefs, since its effect is taken up by that 
variable. Additionally, religiosity remained significant when controlling for age, which was not 
found to be significantly correlated with climate change opinions.  
  
  




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Religious Beliefs -0.25 (0.11) -2.17 0.031** (-0.47, -0.02) 
Religious Behaviors -0.02 (0.12) -0.19 0.850 (-0.25, 0.21) 
Intercept 3.68 (0.16) 23.42 0.000*** (3.37, 3.99) 
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Up until now, I have been laying the foundation for my real hypothesis about the 
relationship between religiosity, party, and opinions of global warming policies. Here, I theorize 
that there will be a difference in the effect of religiosity among Democrats than among 
Republicans. The expected outcomes are outlined in the Climate Change & Religiosity 
Hypothesis, which states:  
Highly Religious Democrats will be more likely to favor policies designed to mitigate the 
effects of Climate Change; but in contrast, Highly Religious Republicans will be less 
likely to favor these same policies (and may even oppose them).  
In other words, high levels of religiosity push a person to the more extreme end of their party’s 
position on the issue.  
 To test this hypothesis, I rely on regression models containing interaction terms between 
party affiliation and religiosity. Below is a table of this interaction in the 2018 ANES dataset. 
The model suggests evidence that the effect of religiosity is different for Republicans than for 
Democrats at all levels (p = 0.033, 0.031, & 0.009). The overall religiosity effect appears to be 
smaller for Republicans (and even positive in the “Some” case, where the coefficient becomes 
+0.27). There is no significant difference in the effect of religiosity for Independents (p > 0.100), 





Table 9: Global Warming Scale Interactions (Party ID & Religiosity) (ANES 2018)27 





t P > |t| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Republicans (Low Religiosity) -8.67 (0.54) -16.16 0.000*** (-9.72, -7.62) 
Independents (Low Religiosity) -3.10 (0.37) -8.30 0.000*** (-3.83, -2.37) 
Other (Low Religiosity) -2.59 (0.93) -2.79 0.005** (-4.40, -0.77) 
Some Religiosity -1.36 (0.39) -3.41 0.001** (-2.14, -0.58) 
More Religiosity -1.56 (0.38) -4.05 0.000*** (-2.31, -0.80) 
Most Religiosity -2.17 (0.41) -5.35 0.000*** (-2.97, -1.38) 
Republicans (Some Religiosity) 1.63 (0.76) 2.14 0.033** (0.14, 3.13) 
Republicans (More Religiosity) 1.48 (0.68) 2.16 0.031** (0.14, 2.82) 
Republicans (Most Religiosity) 1.77 (0.68) 2.61 0.009** (0.44, 3.10) 
Independent (Some Religiosity) -0.06 (0.59) -0.10 0.918 (-1.22, 1.10) 
Independent (More Religiosity) -0.44 (0.56) -0.79 0.430 (-1.54, 0.66) 
Independent (Most Religiosity) -0.59 (0.59) -1.00 0.318 (-1.75, 0.57) 
Other (Some Religiosity) -0.74 (1.52) -0.49 0.627 (-3.71, 2.24) 
Other (More Religiosity) -1.24 (1.45) -0.85 0.393 (-4.09, 1.61) 
Other (Most Religiosity) -2.79 (1.37) -2.04 0.042** (-5.49, -0.10) 
Intercept  15.45 (0.25) 61.55 0.000*** (14.96, 15.94) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 2,257 (2,241); Adjusted R2 = 0.3609; P > F = 0.0000  
These findings appear to contradict my Climate Change & Religiosity Hypothesis, since it does 
not appear that religiosity has a positive effect on Democrat opinion and a negative effect on 
Republican opinion. Moreover, the effects of this interaction are slightly mitigated by the 
introduction of controls for race, education, and gender, into the model. Nevertheless, the general 
conclusions of the above table still hold. For example, the general effect of religiosity holds for 
 
27 Here, I rely on the interaction models described Franzese and Kam’s book Modeling and interpreting interactive 




each level when running the model with controls (p = 0.003, 0.000, & 0.000). Additionally, the 
direction and size the coefficient for Republicans at the “Some” level holds, albeit with a smaller 
resultant coefficient and less significance (+0.14 and p = 0.082). Plus, the Republicans in the 
“Most” group also retained their significance and direction (p = 0.064). Moreover, the lack of 
significance for Independents remains (p > 0.100) as well as the significance of the Other “Most” 
group (p = 0.027).  
 
Furthermore, as this graph illustrates, the effect of religiosity is slightly different across 
parties. Since none of the religiosity-Independents interaction terms were found to be significant, 
that line’s slope should be nearly parallel with the blue Democrat line. Thus, the graph illustrates 
how the effect of religiosity is the same for Democrats and Independents. The group that appears 
to function differently here are the Republicans. While the overall slope appears to be slightly 
negative, it is noticeably flatter than the other two lines. In this way, religiosity appears to have a 
distinct effect on Republicans from its effect on the general population. Furthermore, the 
Figure 15: Religiosity & Party Interaction on GWS (2018) 
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distinction between the overall Republican position and the overall Democratic position, remains 
despite the effect of religiosity. Republicans still score consistently lower than Democrats on the 
Global Warming Scale (2018).  
Next, I will use the 2019 ANES data to attempt to confirm my findings in the 2018 
ANES dataset. Here, the Global Warming Scale (2019) involves potential higher efficiency 
standards and government regulations. First, I explore the interaction between a continuous 
partisan identity scale and a categorical religiosity variable. The second model treats partisan 
identity as a categorical variable and interacts it with the same categorical religiosity variable. 
Below is the first table with the continuous scale:  
Table 10: GWS Interactions (Party ID Scale & Religiosity) (ANES 2019) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 2,938 (2,930); Adjusted R2 = 0.3418; P > F = 0.000 
This model reveals very different results from the interaction models in the 2018 ANES data. 
Most notably, no statistical significance is assigned to any of the religiosity-partisan interaction 
terms (p > 0.100). In other words, there does not appear to be a different effect of religiosity as a 
respondent moves closer to a strong Democrat identity (+3), when compared with someone with 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Partisan Identity Scale 0.46 (0.03) 14.49 0.000*** (0.43, 0.52) 
Some Religiosity -0.51 (0.08) -6.25 0.000*** (-0.67, -0.35) 
More Religiosity -0.62 (0.08) -7.57 0.000*** (-0.78, -0.46) 
Most Religiosity -1.08 (0.10) -10.56 0.000*** (-1.28, -0.88) 
Partisan Scale (Some Religiosity) -0.03 (0.04) -0.97 0.331 (-0.11, 0.04) 
Partisan Scale (More Religiosity) -0.05 (0.04) -1.36 0.173 (-0.13, 0.02) 
Partisan Scale (Most Religiosity) -0.06 (0.05) -1.20 0.230 (-0.15, 0.03) 
Intercept 1.45 (0.07) 22.25 0.000*** (1.32, 1.58) 
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the same level of religiosity on another point on the partisan identity scale. However, there could 
still be an effect for individual parties, as shown in the table below.  
Table 10a: GWS Interactions (Party ID & Religiosity) (ANES 2019) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 2,892 (2,876); Adjusted R2 = 0.2970; P > F = 0.000 
Here, like with the 2018 ANES data, there is still a significant negative effect of religiosity 
across each category (p = 0.000). In contrast, there is no difference in this attendance effect for 
Republicans when compared with Democrats at all levels of religiosity (p > 0.100). However, a 
larger negative effect is present for Independents with religiosity, but only for the “More” and 
“Most” religious categories (p = 0.007 & 0.000). Additionally, the interaction between the 




t P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Republican  -2.07 (0.20) -10.42 0.000*** (-2.46, -1.68) 
Independent -0.78 (0.13) -5.90 0.000*** (-1.04, -0.52) 
Other -0.72 (0.29) -2.50 0.012** (-1.28, -1.55) 
Some Religiosity -0.56 (0.12) -4.59 0.000*** (-0.81, -0.32) 
More Religiosity -0.61 (0.13) -4.70 0.000*** (-0.87, -0.37) 
Most Religiosity -0.75 (0.20) -3.79 0.000*** (-1.14, -0.36) 
Republican (Some Religiosity) -0.07 (0.24) 0.31 0.757 (-0.40, 0.54) 
Republican (More Religiosity) 0.09 (0.24) 0.40 0.688 (-0.37, 0.56) 
Republican (Most Religiosity) -0.18 (0.29) -0.61 0.540 (-0.73, 0.38) 
Independent (Some Religiosity) -0.15 (0.18) -0.81 0.418 (-0.50, 0.21) 
Independent (More Religiosity) -0.50 (0.19)  -2.70 0.007** (-0.87, -0.14) 
Independent (Most Religiosity) -1.34 (0.27) -5.03 0.000*** (-1.86, -0.81) 
Other (Some Religiosity) -0.98 (0.37) -2.65 0.008** (-1.71, -0.26) 
Other (More Religiosity) -1.36 (0.39) -3.49 0.000*** (-2.13, -0.60) 
Other (Most Religiosity) -1.71 (0.43) -3.94 0.000*** (-2.57, -0.86) 
Intercept 2.54 (0.09) 28.24 0.000*** (2.37, 2.72) 
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religiosity and those who aligned with no party (Other), showed significance at every level (p = 
0.008, 0.000, & 0.000). Further, when controlling for race, education, and gender, there is still no 
significantly different effect for any of the Religious Republican categories (p > 0.100). Also, the 
overall religiosity effect remains comparable (p = 0.000). Plus, the effect for Independents in the 
“More” and Others in the “Some” group remained significant, (p = 0.002 & p = 0.008, 
respectively). Finally, the Independent “Most” group as well as the Other religiosity groups were 
also found to be significant and negative, when applying these controls (p = 0.000).  
The graph below also illustrates the effect of religiosity on each party.  
Like the 2018 ANES data, there is a clear separation between the Democratic scores and the 
Republicans scores on the Global Warming Scale (2019) and the different levels of religious 
service attendance do not cause them to switch places. Here, there is a clear negative effect of 
religiosity on opinions of policies designed to mitigate climate change. Moreover, there is no 
Figure 16: Religiosity & Party Interaction on GWS (2019) 
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distinct effect of religiosity on Republicans from the general religiosity effect, as the red and blue 
lines appear to be parallel. Further, the Independents have a steeper negative slope, since there is 
a significant negative effect for that group (p = 0.000). Thus, the effect is stronger for that group 
than for Republicans or Democrats.  
 Next, I will explore how these interactions function in the 2020 M-Turk survey. The 
regression model below, reveals very similar results to the 2018 ANES dataset:  
Table 11: GWS Interactions (Party ID & Religiosity) (M-Turk 2020) 





t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Republicans -3.77 (0.46) -8.13 0.000*** (-4.68, -2.86) 
Independents -0.46 (0.33) -1.38 0.168 (-1.11, 0.19) 
Religiosity -0.17 (0.04) -4.08 0.000*** (-0.26, -0.09) 
Religious Republicans 0.53 (0.09) 6.20 0.000*** (0.36, 0.70) 
Religious Independents  -0.07 (0.09) -0.85 0.395 (-0.24, 0.10) 
Intercept (Democrats) 4.25 (0.19) 22.61 0.000*** (3.88, 4.62) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 320 (314); Adjusted R2 = 0.2185; P > F = 0.0000 
 
The effect of religiosity on Republicans is distinct from its effect on other groups (p = 0.000). 
Here, religious Republicans show a slight increase in support for global warming policies. The 
model shows that the effect of religiosity for religious Republicans is +0.36, whereas the impact 
of religiosity for Democrats runs in the opposite direction and is smaller (-0.17). This finding is 
the exact opposite of my prediction in the Climate Change & Religiosity Hypothesis.  
Below is a graph illustrating the trends of the data for each political party. Since 
religiosity had no distinct effect for Independents, their slope ought to be nearly parallel to the 
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Democrat’s blue line. In contrast, since the effect of religiosity for Republicans was positive and 
significant, their slope runs in the opposite direction of the Democrats. 
 
 
 Next, I will explore potentially different effects of religious beliefs and behaviors within 
these interactions. The table below contains interactions of beliefs on party, behaviors on party, 
as well as beliefs on behaviors. For religious beliefs, there was no statistically significant 
differences in its effect across each party. Nevertheless, religious behaviors interactions did 
produce significant results in the same directions previously found in the 2020 and 2018 data. 
Republicans with more religious behaviors scored higher on the global warming scale than those 
of the same party who engaged with less religious behavior (p = 0.000). Democrats with more 
religious behaviors scored lower than those of the same party who engaged with less religious 
behavior (p = 0.000).  
Figure 17: Religiosity & Party Interaction on GWS (2020) 
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Table 12: GWS Interactions (Beliefs & Behaviors) (M-Turk 2020) 





t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Republicans -3.79 (0.57) -6.60 0.000*** (-4.92, -2.66) 
Independents -0.62 (0.36) -1.71 0.088* (-1.32, 0.09) 
Religious Beliefs -0.24 (0.18) -1.31 0.192 (-0.60, 0.12) 
Religious Beliefs 
(Republicans) 
0.05 (0.33) 0.15 0.884 (-0.59, 0.69) 
Religious Beliefs 
(Independents) 
-0.03 (0.33) -0.10 0.919 (-0.68, 0.62) 
Religious Behaviors -0.82 (0.23) -3.63 0.000*** (-1.27, -0.38) 
Religious Behaviors 
(Republicans) 
1.44 (0.23) 3.84 0.000*** (0.70, 2.18) 
Religious Behaviors 
(Independents) 
0.24 (0.43) 0.56 0.573 (-0.60, 1.09) 
Religious Beliefs * 
Religious Behaviors 
0.21 (0.08) 2.72 0.007** (0.06, 0.36) 
Religious Beliefs * 
Religious Behaviors 
(Republicans) 
-0.14 (0.13) -1.10 0.274 (-0.39, 0.11) 
Religious Beliefs * 
Religious Behaviors 
(Independents) 
-0.09 (0.17) -0.51 0.609 (-0.42, 0.24) 
Intercept (Democrats) 4.52 (0.21) 21.95 0.000*** (4.12, 4.93) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 320 (308); Adjusted R2 = 0.2445; P > F = 0.0000 
There was also a statistically significant interaction between religious beliefs and religious 
behaviors (p = 0.007). In this model, those with high levels of religious beliefs and high levels of 
religious behaviors scored slightly higher on the Global Warming Scale (2020). However, this 
finding was not found to be significantly different across parties. Furthermore, these holdings 




 Below is a graphical representation of the different effects of religious behaviors across 
groups. Again, the effects of religious behavior for Democrats and Independents are very similar, 
due to its large p-value (p = 0.573). In contrast, religious behaviors appear to have a positive 
effect on Republicans scores on the Global Warming Scale (2020).  
In sum, there appears to be strong evidence against my Religiosity & Climate Change 
Hypothesis. The interaction between religiosity and party identity appears to run in the opposite 
direction suggested by the hypothesis. Indeed, my analyses indicated that highly religious 
Democrats are slightly less supportive of global warming policies, and highly religious 
Republicans are slightly more supportive of these policies. Furthermore, it appears that this 
relationship is being driven more by religious behaviors over religious beliefs.  
 




Next, I will explore the effect these interactions may have on vaccine opinions. Of 
course, before I describe these relationships, I must first explore the relationship between 
religiosity and vaccines in a more general sense. Below is a regression model of the vaccines & 
autism score based on a continuous religiosity variable from the 2019 ANES dataset. 




“Climate Change follows 
Partisan Identity; Republicans 
will score lower than Democrats 
on Global Warming Scales.” 
I found strong evidence supporting this 
hypothesis. Republicans scored lower 
than Democrats on Global Warming 
Scales across three datasets (p = 0.000). 
 




“Opinions about vaccines will 
not correlate with political 
parties.” 
I found strong evidence against this 
hypothesis. Republicans tended to score 
lower on Vaccine Scales across both 
datasets (p = 0.000).  
 
See Tables 4-5a 
3. Religiosity & 
Climate Change 
Hypothesis 
“Highly Religious Democrats 
will be more likely to favor 
policies designed to mitigate the 
effects of Climate Change; but 
in contrast, Highly Religious 
Republicans will be less likely 
to favor these same policies (and 
may even oppose them).” 
 
I found moderate evidence against this 
hypothesis. In each dataset, religiosity 
was negatively correlated with the 
GWS (p = 0.000). However, in the 
interaction model, results were mixed. 
Democrats with high levels of 
religiosity scored lower on the GWS in 
all datasets (p = 0.000). Republicans 
with high religiosity in 2018 & 2020 
scored higher (p = 0.000) but were not 
significantly different in the 2019 
dataset (p > 0.100).  
 
See Tables 6-12 
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Table 13: Vaccines & Autism Score by Religiosity (Continuous) (ANES 2019) 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Religiosity 0.07 (0.01) 8.85 0.000*** (0.05, 0.08) 
Intercept -2.66 (0.07) -40.06 0.000*** (-2.79, -2.53) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 3,008 (3,006); Adjusted R2 = 0.0251; P > F = 0.000 
Here, there is a significant positive relationship between religiosity and the belief that vaccines 
are linked to autism. However, (much like with climate change), I am curious how this 
relationship is spread out across the variable. Below is a table with means of vaccine beliefs over 
a collapsed religiosity variable as well as a regression model. Here there are four different levels 
of religiosity based on the vaccine scores at each of the 17 levels of religiosity. 
Table 13a: Mean Vaccines & Autism Score by Religiosity (ANES 2019) 
Levels of Religiosity (0-16) Observations Mean (Standard 
Error) 
95% Confidence Interval 
Low Religiosity (0-1) 697 -2.86 (0.07) (-3.01, -2.72) 
Some Religiosity (2-6) 774 -2.21 (0.08) (-2.36, -2.05) 
More Religiosity (7-11) 856 -1.84 (0.08) (-1.99, -1.68) 
Most Religiosity (12-16) 707 -1.93 (0.09) (-2.10, -1.76) 
 
Table 13b: Vaccines & Autism Score by Religiosity (Categorical) (ANES 2019) 





t P > |t| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Some Religiosity (2-6) 0.66 (0.11) 5.73 0.000*** (0.45, 1.92) 
More Religiosity (7-11) 1.03 (0.11) 9.15 0.000*** (0.20, 0.73) 
Most Religiosity (12-16) 0.93 (0.12) 7.95 0.000*** (0.16, 0.80) 
Intercept (Low Religiosity) -2.86 (0.08) -34.47 0.000*** (-3.02, -2.70) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 




The regression table shows a significant relationship for all levels of religiosity (p = 0.000). 
However, this effect is not constant across groups. Indeed, if it were, I would expect the “Most” 
group to have the largest coefficient instead of the second largest. Here, the difference between 
the “More” and “Most” groups is only about 0.1, whereas the difference between the “Some” 
and “More” groups is 0.38. Thus, the effect is strongest for the “More” group, with only a 
slightly smaller effect for the “Most” group. Plus, the “Some” group experience the smallest 
effect from religiosity. In this way, the effect of religiosity on vaccine opinions is not-linear; it 
decreases confidence in the belief that there is no link between vaccines and autism and this 
effect peaks in the middle of the religiosity scale. Furthermore, when controlling for age in the 
model, the effects of religiosity remain significant.  
 Next, I will explore the 2020 M-Turk data on vaccines and religiosity. Below, the 
regression model illustrates that an increased level of religiosity is associated with a decrease in 
score on the vaccines scale (p = 0.000).  
Table 14: Vaccines by Religiosity (M-Turk 2020) 
Vaccines Coefficients 
(Standard Error) 
t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Religiosity -0.20 (0.02) -10.21 0.000*** (-0.24, -0.16) 
Intercept 3.12 (0.09) 34.26 0.000*** (2.94, 3.30) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 352 (350); Adjusted R2 = 0.2274; P > F = 0.0000 
 
However, since this religiosity scale is robust, containing measures of beliefs and behaviors, I 
might expect to see a different effect for each of these components. Below are two tables 
illustrating the effects religious beliefs have on vaccine opinion and the effect religious behaviors 
have on vaccine opinions, respectively. Similarly, here, the effects of religiosity persist even 
when controlling for age.  
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Table 14a: Vaccines by Religious Beliefs vs Behaviors (M-Turk 2020) 
Vaccines Coefficients 
(Standard Error) 
t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Religious Beliefs -0.07 (0.06) -1.08 0.279 (-0.19, 0.06) 
Religious Behaviors -0.33 (0.06) -5.00 0.000*** (-0.46, -0.20) 
Intercept 3.14 (0.09) 34.46 0.000*** (2.95, 3.32) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 352 (349); Adjusted R2 = 0.2349; P > F = 0.0000 
 
Here too, religious beliefs and behaviors are getting at the same underlying concept. Thus, only 
one is significant in the above model. In contrast to climate change, with vaccines, it appears that 
behaviors more fully capture the concept than beliefs. When evaluated in separate models, there 
was a statistically significant negative relationship between religious beliefs or behaviors and 
vaccine opinions (p = 0.000).  
Next, I move to explore the effect of the interaction between party affiliation and 
religiosity on vaccine opinions. Here, like in the case of global warming, the Vaccines & 
Religiosity Hypothesis is  
Highly Religious Democrats will score higher on the Vaccine Scale; Highly Religious 
Republicans will score lower on the Vaccine Scale. 
In other words, highly religious individuals will be on the extreme ends of each party. Below, is 




Table 15: Vaccines & Autism Interactions (Party ID Scale & Religiosity) (ANES 2019) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 2,923 (2,915); Adjusted R2 = 0.0518; P > F = 0.000 
The regression model illustrates the effect of religiosity and the partisan identity scale on the 
belief that vaccines are linked to autism. Like in both previous models, as a person’s partisan 
identity increases (towards Democrats at +3), their confidence in the lack of a link between 
vaccines and autism goes down significantly (p = 0.000). Moreover, the general effect of 
religiosity still holds; as it increases, the belief that vaccines are linked to autism also increases 
(p =0.000). Here, there are significant interactions for all levels of religiosity (p = 0.061, 0.000, 
& 0.003). Although, the largest coefficient is the one associated with the “More” group, rather 
than the “Most” category. However, to better illustrate the different effect of religiosity across 
parties, I will use a model evaluating political parties as a categorical variable, rather than a 
continuous one.    




t P > |t| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Partisan Identity Scale -0.27 (0.04) -5.87 0.000*** (0.43, 0.52) 
Some Religiosity 0.46 (0.12) 3.73 0.000*** (0.22, 0.71) 
More Religiosity 0.79 (0.12) 6.51 0.000*** (0.55, 1.03) 
Most Religiosity 0.64 (0.13) 4.89 0.000*** (0.38, 0.89) 
Partisan Scale (Some Religiosity) 0.11 (0.06) 1.88 0.061* (0.00, 0.23) 
Partisan Scale (More Religiosity) 0.23 (0.06) 3.95 0.000*** (0.11, 0.34) 
Partisan Scale (Most Religiosity) 0.17 (0.06) -2.96 0.003** (0.06, 0.29) 
Intercept -2.65 (0.09) -27.89 0.000*** (-2.83, -2.46) 
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Table 15a: Vaccines & Autism Interactions (Party ID & Religiosity) (ANES 2019) 





t P > |t| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Republican  1.11 (0.28) 3.98 0.000*** (0.56, 1.66) 
Independent 0.38 (0.19) 2.02 0.043** (0.01, 0.74) 
Other 0.37 (0.40) 0.91 0.362 (-0.42, 1.15) 
Some Religiosity 0.62 (0.18) 3.38 0.001** (0.26, 0.99) 
More Religiosity 1.34 (0.18) 7.39 0.000*** (0.99, 1.70) 
Most Religiosity 0.99 (0.22) 4.47 0.000*** (0.56, 1.43) 
Republican (Some Religiosity) -0.39 (0.35) -1.12 0.263 (-1.08, 0.29) 
Republican (More Religiosity) -1.05 (0.34) -3.12 0.002** (-1.71, -0.39) 
Republican (Most Religiosity) -0.66 (0.35) -1.86 0.063* (-1.36, 0.04) 
Independent (Some Religiosity) 0.14 (0.27) 0.52 0.602 (-0.38, 0.66) 
Independent (More Religiosity) -0.26 (0.26)  -0.97 0.334 (-0.77, 0.26) 
Independent (Most Religiosity) 0.01 (0.31) 0.03 0.980 (-0.60, 0.61) 
Other (Some Religiosity) 0.18 (0.54) 0.34 0.737 (-0.88, -1.25) 
Other (More Religiosity) 0.01 (0.56) 0.01 0.992 (-1.09, 1.11) 
Other (Most Religiosity) -0.09 (0.56) -0.16 0.871 (-1.19, -1.01) 
Intercept -3.27 (0.13) -25.85 0.000*** (-3.52, -3.02) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 2,877 (2,861); Adjusted R2 = 0.0450; P > F = 0.000 
 
The table shows some evidence for this interaction. It appears that religiosity functions 
differently for Republicans than it does for Democrats or Independents. However, this effect 
only appears to diverge in the “More” and “Most” groups (p = 0.002 & 0.063, respectively). In 
the “More” category, the resultant effect for Republican is slightly stronger: the general effect is 
1.34, but for Republicans it becomes 1.40. Furthermore, for Republicans in the “Most” group, 
the coefficient goes from 0.99 (in general) to 1.44 for Republicans, albeit with less significance. 
Either way, there appears to be a stronger effect of religiosity on Republicans than Democrats 
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when it comes to believing in a link between vaccines and autism. Religious Republicans appear 
to be less confident that there is no link between vaccines and autism than their less religious 
political counterparts. Additionally, these findings for religiosity hold when controlling for race, 
education, and gender (p = 0.045, 0.000, & 0.042). However, the only level of religiosity that 
remains somewhat significant for Republicans is the “More” group (p = 0.062).  
 The graph below illustrates the average position of each party across levels of religiosity:  
 Here, the general effect of religiosity is the same for Democrats and Independents, so their lines 
are parallel and positive. In contrast, the Republican line appears to be flatter, perhaps indicating 
that the difference in the effect is inconsistent across levels of religiosity.  
 Moreover, the effect of religiosity remains at all levels, even when adding controls for 
race, education, and gender (p = 0.045, 0.000, & 0.042). Here, the most significant effect is still 
associated with the “More” group.  However, the only significant Republican interaction in that 
Figure 19: Religiosity & Party Interaction on Vaccines & Autism (2019) 
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model was the “More” group (p = 0.065). All other levels of Republican religiosity were found 
not to be significant. Thus, only some of the findings involving religiosity still hold, mainly the 
ones pertaining to the middling level of religiosity.  
Next, I will explore this party and religiosity interaction within the 2020 M-Turk data. 




t P > |t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Republicans -1.19 (0.29) -4.11 0.000*** (-0.10, -0.02) 
Independents -0.15 (0.21) -0.73 0.464 (-0.56, 0.26) 
Religiosity -0.22 (0.03) -8.39 0.000*** (-0.27, -0.17) 
Religious Republicans 0.20 (0.05) 3.72 0.000*** (0.09, 0.30) 
Religious Independents -0.08 (0.05) -1.49 0.138 (-0.19, 0.03) 
Intercept (Democrats) 3.31 (0.12) 28.45 0.000*** (3.08, 3.54) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 345 (339); Adjusted R2 = 0.2691; P > F = 0.000 
 
Here, the regression table interactions show a significant negative effect for Democrats and a 
significant positive effect for Republicans (p = 0.000). These findings hold when controlling for 
gender, race, education, and age.  
The graph below (Figure 22) illustrates the different effects of religiosity for each group 
by party on vaccines in the 2020 M-Turk dataset.    
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Here, there is a general negative trend in the Democrat data. An increase in religiosity is 
associated with a lower mean vaccine score for Democrats. In contrast, the Republican graph 
indicates a lack of a linear relationship between mean vaccine scores and religiosity. Here, if 
there is a slight increase in vaccine scores for religious Republicans, it remains a relatively small 
push, and it has very little overall effect. Finally, the graph of Independents mirrors the 
Democrats, albeit with a slightly lower intercept and steeper negative slope.  
  
Figure 20: Religiosity & Party Interaction on Vaccines (2020) 
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Finally, I will take some time to explore the interaction between party and religious 
beliefs and behaviors on vaccine opinions.  
Table 17: Vaccine Interactions (Beliefs & Behaviors) (M-Turk 2020) 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.050  * p < 0.100 
N(df) = 345 (333); Adjusted R2 = 0.3091; P > F = 0.0000 
Here, there is some significance for religious beliefs having a negative effect on vaccine opinions 
(p = 0.029). However, there is strong evidence against the idea that strong religious beliefs have 
different effects for Republicans than for Democrats in the case of vaccines (p = 0.216). 
Similarly, religious behaviors were also negatively associated with vaccine opinions (p = 0.000). 
Here too, there was no difference in this effect for Republicans than for Democrats (p = 0.176). 
Finally, the interaction between beliefs and behaviors yielded a positive, significant coefficient 




t P > |t| 95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Republicans -1.14 (0.36) -3.17 0.002** (-1.84, -0.43) 
Independents -0.19 (0.22) -0.87 0.385 (-0.64, 0.25) 
Religious Beliefs -0.24 (0.11) -2.19 0.029** (-0.46, 0.02) 
Religious Beliefs (Republicans) 0.24 (0.20) 1.24 0.216 (-0.14, 0.62) 
Religious Beliefs (Independents) -0.16 (0.21) -0.76 0.449 (-0.56, 0.25) 
Religious Behaviors -0.72 (0.13) -5.39 0.000*** (-0.99, -0.46) 
Religious Behaviors (Republicans) 0.31 (0.23) 1.36 0.176 (-0.14, 0.76) 
Religious Behaviors (Independents) -0.03 (0.26) -0.11 0.910 (-0.54, 0.48) 
Religious Beliefs * Religious Behaviors 0.15 (0.05) 3.32 0.001** (0.06, 0.24) 
Religious Beliefs * Religious Behaviors 
(Republicans) 
-0.06 (0.08) -0.78 0.438 (-0.22, 0.09) 
Religious Beliefs * Religious Behaviors 
(Independents) 
0.04 (0.10) 0.36 0.716 (-0.17, 0.24) 
Intercept 3.52 (0.13) 27.97 0.000*** (3.27, 3.77) 
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religiosity is still in the negative direction. These findings also hold when controlling for race, 
education, age, and gender.  
In sum, I find some evidence against the Religiosity & Vaccines Hypothesis. Those 
Democrats with higher levels of religiosity tended to score lower on vaccine scales than those of 
the same party who are less religious. In contrast, the relationship for highly religious 
Republicans appears to be either slightly positive or no different than their Democratic 
counterparts.  
 Before moving on to the next section of this thesis, which will deal with the experiments 
from the 2020 M-Turk dataset, it is important to recap what I have described up to this point and 
update my hypothesis table. So far, I found evidence suggesting a partisan difference in climate 
change as well as vaccine opinions between Democrats and Republicans. High levels of 
religiosity are associated with lower scores on each Global Warming Scale, as well as lower 
scores on Vaccines Scales. Finally, I found some evidence that religiosity functions differently 
for Republicans than for Democrats. In the case of Climate Change, religiosity appears to have 
opposite effects for Democrats and Republicans. Although, there does appear to be a difference 
in the party-religiosity interaction effect when the outcome variable involves the respondent’s 
perceived impacts of climate change, compared to when the outcome involves specific policy 
preferences. Furthermore, in the case of vaccines, when adding controls, religiosity’s interaction 




In the next section, I will explore the results of the experiment at the start of the M-Turk 
survey. The purpose of the experiment was to see if religiosity can be primed through a framing 




“Climate Change follows 
Partisan Identity; Republicans 
will score lower than Democrats 
on Global Warming Scales.” 
I found strong evidence supporting this 
hypothesis. Republicans scored lower 
than Democrats on Global Warming 
Scales across three datasets (p = 0.000). 
 




“Opinions about vaccines will 
not correlate with political 
parties.” 
I found strong evidence against this 
hypothesis. Republicans tended to score 
lower on Vaccine Scales across both 
datasets (p = 0.000).  
 
See Tables 4-5a 
3. Religiosity & 
Climate Change 
Hypothesis 
“Highly Religious Democrats 
will be more likely to favor 
policies designed to mitigate the 
effects of Climate Change; but 
in contrast, Highly Religious 
Republicans will be less likely 
to favor these same policies (and 
may even oppose them).” 
 
I found moderate evidence against this 
hypothesis. In each dataset, religiosity 
was negatively correlated with the 
GWS (p = 0.000). However, in the 
interaction model, results were mixed. 
Democrats with high levels of 
religiosity scored lower on the GWS in 
all datasets (p = 0.000). Republicans 
with high religiosity in 2018 & 2020 
scored higher (p = 0.000) but were not 
significantly different in the 2019 
dataset (p > 0.100).  
 
See Tables 6-12 
4. Religiosity & 
Vaccines 
Hypothesis 
“Highly Religious Democrats 
will score higher on the Vaccine 
Scale; Highly Religious 
Republicans will score lower on 
the Vaccine Scale.” 
 
I found moderate evidence against this 
hypothesis. In both the 2019 and 2020 
datasets, religiosity was negatively 
correlated with each dataset’s Vaccine 
Scale (p < 0.050). I found a significant 
interaction for Republicans & 
religiosity in the 2019 dataset, but only 
for moderate levels of religiosity. The 
interaction in the 2020 dataset did 
indicate a difference in the direction of 
the size of religiosity for Democrats 
when compared with Republicans (p = 
0.000). 
 
See Tables 13-17 
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experiment, resulting in an increase of opinions of climate change and vaccines. One benefit of 
the experimental format was its ability to minimize the effect of confounding variables. 
Experiment Test Results 
The first hypothesis about the results of the experiment is as follows: The religious language will 
be effective at raising respondents’ scores on both issues. 








95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
179 0.79 (0.02) 0.27 (0.75, 0.83) 
Religiosity 
Frame (t) 
174 0.77 (0.02) 0.28 (0.73, 0.81) 
Combined 353 0.78 (0.01) 0.27 (0.75, 0.81) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.02 (0.03)  (-0.04, 0.08) 
t = 0.7020; df = 351 
P (T < t) = 0.7584 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.4832 P (T > t) = 0.2416 
 
  
Figure 21: Climate Change Experiment  
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An unpaired t-test between the two climate change groups revealed no statistically significant 
difference in means between those respondents who received the religious frame and those in the 
control group. Similar results were found in the vaccines experiment, where there was also no 
statistically significant difference between control and experiment groups.  
Table 19: Vaccines Experiment (M-Turk 2020): 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
165 0.82 (0.02) 0.26 (0.78, 0.86) 
Religiosity 
Frame (t) 
192 0.81 (0.02) 0.27 (0.77, 0.84) 
Combined 357 0.81 (0.01) 0.26 (0.79, 0.84) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.02 (0.03)  (-0.04, 0.07) 
t = 0.6462: df = 355 
P (T < t) = 0.7407 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.5186 P (T > t) = 0.2593 
 
  
Figure 22: Vaccines Experiment 
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Since these experiments were run in succession, there may also be questions about the 
lingering effects of the vaccines religious frame on the Climate Change Experiment. However, as 
mentioned earlier in the methods section, I think these effects are mitigated slightly by the 
presence of additional general buffer questions between that section and the climate change one. 
Hopefully, these general vaccine questions would reduce the effect of that religious frame.  

















83 0.79 (0.03) 0.27 (0.73, 0.85) 
Combined 179 0.79 (0.02) 0.27 (0.75, 0.83) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.00 (0.04)  (-0.08, 0.08) 
t = -0.0023; df = 177 
P (T < t) = 0.4991 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.9981 P (T > t) = 0.5009 
 
Here, the effects of receiving the vaccine religious language on the climate change control group 
is practically non-existent. Indeed, the results of these two groups appear nearly identical. 
However, there may still be a lingering effect for those who received a double dosage of the 
religious language. There is a possibility that the effect of the religious frame on climate change 
could be magnified since the respondent received multiple appeals to their religiosity. Perhaps a 
reinforcement, through multiple priming’s is required to make religiosity salient for the 
respondent. Below is a table illustrating the results from that t-test:   
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79 0.80 (0.03) 0.26 (0.75, 0.86) 
Combined 174 0.77 (0.02) 0.28 (0.73, 0.81) 
Difference  (T-t) -0.06 (0.04)  (-0.15, 0.02) 
t = -1.5179; df = 172 
P (T < t) = 0.0654 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.1309 P (T > t) = 0.9346 
Here, there is some evidence that there was an additional effect of the vaccine religious frame on 
the religious climate change group (p = 0.0654). Not only that, but those who received both the 
vaccine religious frame and the climate change religious frame had a higher mean climate score 
than those who only received the religious language once. Nevertheless, since this impact only 
carries moderate significance, it is unsurprising that its effects did not translate into results 
described by Table 18 and Figure 23.  
My attention now shifts to examining different groups’ responses to each frame in the 
experiment. I begin with party identification, then move to examine those with different levels of 
religiosity, and then conclude with those who view the issues with varying levels of importance. 
Of course, there is reduced power in some of these tests, due to the smaller group sizes.  
Below are the results from the Climate Change experiment between the parties. Here, 
since no statistically significant difference was found between the control and experiment 
groups, I chose to combine these two groups when comparing Democrats to Republicans, 
thereby enabling the test to have more statistical power.  
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Table 21: Climate Change & Party (Democrats & Republicans) (M-Turk 2020) 





95% Confidence Interval 
Democrats 
(T) 
168 0.83 (0.02) 0.25 (0.80, 0.87) 
Republicans 
(t) 
106 0.67 (0.03) 0.29 (0.62, 0.73) 
Combined 274 0.77 (0.02) 0.27 (0.72, 0.81) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.16 (0.03)  (0.10, 0.22) 
t = 4.8626; df = 272 
P (T < t) = 1.0000 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 P (T > t) = 0.0000 
 
These findings in this table are unsurprising and confirm what I already showed in earlier 
regression analyses: support for climate change follows partisan cues (see The Partisan Climate 
Change Hypothesis). Of course, the question now becomes is there a difference between the 
religious and control groups within each party. Here, I hypothesized that in both cases, the 
religious frame would result in a higher score in both Democrats and Republicans. The two 
tables below illustrate how this was not found to be the case. 
Table 21a: Democrats with Different Frames on Climate Change Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
82 0.84 (0.03) 0.23 (0.79, 0.89) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
86 0.82 (0.03) 0.26 (0.77, 0.88) 
Combined 168 0.83 (0.02) 0.25 (0.80, 0.87) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.02 (0.04)  (-0.06, 0.09) 
t = 0.4152; df = 166 




Table 21b: Republicans with Different Frames on Climate Change Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
56 0.66 (0.04) 0.28 (0.59, 0.74) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
50 0.69 (0.04) 0.30 (0.61, 0.77) 
Combined 136 0.78 (0.02) 0.283 (0.73, 0.82) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.14 (0.05)  (0.04, 0.23) 
t = -0.5227; df = 104 
P (T < t) = 0.3011 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.6023 P (T > t) = 0.6989 
 
Ultimately, there appears to be no significant difference between the means of those Democrats 
who received the religious frame and those in the control group for the climate change 
experiment. This finding also held true for Republicans. In other words, Republicans are not 
more likely to support government action on climate change when the issue is framed in 
religious terms than if it is not. Democrats appear to be similarly unaffected.  
 Next, I will examine these party and frame differences for the vaccine experiment. Here, 
since I hypothesized that there is no significant difference between an individual’s party and their 
beliefs about the importance of getting vaccinated, I expect there to be no difference in means 
between Democrats and Republicans in their responses to the question. Additionally, like with 




Table 22: Vaccines & Party (Democrats & Republicans) (M-Turk 2020) 





95% Confidence Interval 
Democrats 
(T) 
171 0.83 (0.02) 0.27 (0.79, 0.87) 
Republicans 
(t) 
106 0.81 (0.03) 0.27 (0.76, 0.86) 
Combined 277 0.82 (0.02) 0.27 (0.79, 0.86) 
Difference  (T-t) -0.03 (0.03)  (-0.04, 0.09) 
t = 0.8061; df = 275 
P (T < t) = 0.7896 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.4209 P (T > t) = 0.2104 
 
Here, there was no statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republicans for 
vaccines. Nevertheless, it is also important to examine if the religious framing was effective at 
increasing support for vaccines in each party on its own. Since I hypothesized that the religious 
framing would be effective at increasing support for vaccines, I would expect the religious 
frames to increase support for vaccines in both Democrats and Republicans.  
Table 22a: Democrats with Different Frames on Vaccines Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
79 0.84 (0.03) 0.27 (0.78, 0.90) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
92 0.83 (0.28) 0.27 (0.77, 0.89) 
Combined 171 0.83 (0.02) 0.27 (0.79, 0.87) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.01 (0.41)  (-0.07, 0.09) 
t = 0.2374; df = 169 
P (T < t) = 0.5937 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.8126 P (T > t) = 0.4063 
In the case of Democrats, the religious frame appears to have no effect, and the difference 
between the groups is negligible. The same holds true for Republicans, with one key distinction. 
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The table below suggests there might even be some evidence that my religious frame had the 
opposite of the desired effect – that it decreased Republican support for vaccines. Yet, this claim 
is not based in super strong evidence. Here, the p-value of 0.0765, only carries a little bit of 
significance, meaning it is still possible to conclude that there is no actual difference between the 
control and experimental Republican groups’ answers to the vaccine question.   
Table 22b Republicans with Different Frames on Vaccines Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
45 0.85 (0.05) 0.25 (0.78, 0.92) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
61 0.78 (0.04) 0.29 (0.70, 0.85) 
Combined 106 0.81 (0.03) 0.27 (0.76, 0.86) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.08 (0.05)  (-0.03, 0.18) 
t = -0.5227; df = 104 
P (T < t) = 0.9235 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.1529 P (T > t) = 0.0765 
 
Next, I will turn to the effect of the religious frame on folks with higher religiosity scores 
on issues of climate change and then vaccines. Here, I expect those with high religiosity to score 
significantly higher in the religious frame relative to those in the same frame who had lower 
levels of religiosity.  








95% Confidence Interval 
High (T) 100 0.74 (0.03) 0.27 (0.69, 0.80) 
Low (t) 76 0.80 (0.03) 0.29 (0.74, 0.87) 
Combined 176 0.77 (0.02) 0.28 (0.73, 0.81) 
Difference  (T-t) -0.06 (0.04)  (-0.14, 0.02) 
t = -1.4201; df = 174 
P (T < t) = 0.0787 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.1574 P (T > t) = 0.9213 
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In contrast, there is some slight statistical evidence suggesting that those with higher levels of 
religiosity scored lower on the climate change experiment when given the religious frame than 
their counterparts with lower levels of religiosity. However, this finding is based on relatively 
weak statistical evidence. Furthermore, the results of the control group comparison suggests that 
those with high levels of religiosity scored lower in the climate change experiment regardless of 
the frame they were given. There, I might have expected to see no statistically significant 
differences in the two control groups because an explicit appeal to religion was not made. 
Moreover, this finding supports what I already showed regarding religiosity and climate change.  
Here, it is unsurprising that those with low levels of religiosity scored higher on the climate 
change experiment within the control group because the regression model revealed a negative 
association between religiosity and support for climate change policies (see Table 8).  








95% Confidence Interval 
High (T) 101 0.77 (0.03) 0.26 (0.71, 0.82) 
Low (t) 78 0.82 (0.03) 0.28 (0.76, 0.88) 
Combined 179 0.79 (0.02) 0.27 (0.75, 0.83) 
Difference  (T-t) -0.06 (0.04)  (-0.14, 0.02) 
t = -1.3846; df = 177 
P (T < t) = 0.0840 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.1679 P (T > t) = 0.9160 
 
Nevertheless, I also want to compare those with high religiosity who received the religious frame 
on climate change and those with high religiosity who did not, as well as those with low 
religiosity who received the religious climate change treatment with those who did not. I do not 
expect that those with high levels of religiosity who received the religious language will score 
higher than those with similar levels of religiosity in the control group.  
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Table 23c:  High Religiosity & Different Frames on Climate Change Comparison  





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
101 0.77 (0.03) 0.26 (0.71, 0.82) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
100 0.74 (0.03) 0.27 (0.70, 0.80) 
Combined 201 0.75 (0.02) 0.27 (0.72, 0.79) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.02 (0.04)  (-0.05, 0.10) 
t = 0.5966; df = 199 
P (T < t) = 0.7243 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.5514 P (T > t) = 0.2757 
 
However, these findings contradict my hypothesis about those with high levels of religiosity. 
There was no statistical difference in the climate change experiment between control and 
experiment groups for those with high levels of religiosity. As for those with low levels of 
religiosity, I also expect the treatment to have no effect on the respondents’ answers.  
Table 23d:  Low Religiosity & Different Frames on Climate Change Comparison  





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
78 0.82 (0.03) 0.28 (0.76, 0.88) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
76 0.80 (0.03) 0.29 (0.74, 0.87) 
Combined 154 0.81 (0.02) 0.28 (0.77, 0.86) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.02 (0.05)  (-0.07, 0.11) 
t = 0.3944; df = 152 
P (T < t) = 0.6531 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.6938 P (T > t) = 0.3469 
 
The results of this t-test would indicate that those with low levels of religiosity were unaffected 
by the difference of language in the climate change experiment.  
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 While I did see that the frame was ineffective with both groups of folks at the extreme 
ends of the religiosity scales, there may be a chance that the frame was effective with those in the 
middle. These people have enough religiosity that the frame could effectively make it salient, but 
not too much where they are already factoring it into their consideration of the issue. Below are 
the results of the climate change experiment with the middling religiosity scores. Here, these 
folks are defined as anyone who scored between 1.5 and 5.75 on the religiosity scale, which runs 
from -1 to 8. 
Table 23e: Medium Religiosity & Different Frames on Climate Change Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
69 0.72 (0.03) 0.28 (0.65, 0.79) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
78 0.71 (0.03) 0.29 (0.65, 0.78) 
Combined 147 0.71 (0.02) 0.28 (0.67, 0.76) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.01 (0.05)  (-0.09, 0.10) 
t = 0.1244; df = 145 
P (T < t) = 0.5494 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.9012 P (T > t) = 0.4506 
 
Ultimately, the religious frame was ineffective at getting respondents to answer more favorably 
on the climate change experiment, even among those with medium levels of religiosity.  
Next, I will explore potential differences in the vaccine experiment scores across 
different levels of religiosity. Like in the case of climate change, I expect those with higher 
levels of religiosity who received the vaccine question framed with religious language to score 
higher than those who received the same religious language but had lower levels of religiosity. In 
the vaccine control group, I expect those with higher levels of religiosity to score lower than 
those with lower levels of religiosity (see Table 14).  
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95% Confidence Interval 
High (T) 107 0.79 (0.03) 0.26 (0.74, 0.85) 
Low (t) 86 0.81 (0.03) 0.27 (0.76, 0.87) 
Combined 193 0.80 (0.02) 0.27 (0.77, 0.84) 
Difference  (T-t) -0.02 (0.04)  (-0.10, 0.06) 
t = -0.5080; df = 191 
P (T < t) = 0.3060 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.6120 P (T > t) = 0.6940 
 
Here, the results showed no difference between those with high levels of religiosity and those 
with low levels of religiosity on the religious vaccine frame.  








95% Confidence Interval 
High (T) 97 0.81 (0.03) 0.27 (0.76, 0.87) 
Low (t) 69 0.84 (0.03) 0.25 (0.78, 0.90) 
Combined 166 0.82 (0.02) 0.26 (0.78, 0.86) 
Difference  (T-t) -0.03 (0.04)  (-0.11, 0.05) 
t = -1.8971; df = 168 
P (T < t) = 0.2424 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.4847 P (T > t) = 0.7576 
Here, I again find no difference between the two groups who received the vaccines control 
language. This finding is somewhat inconsistent with my earlier regression analyses between 
religiosity and opinions about vaccines.  
Next, I move to compare the effect of the religious vaccine frame within the high 
religiosity group and the low religiosity group. Here, I expect those with higher levels of 
religiosity to be more susceptible to the religious language given to the treatment group. I also 
expect no difference between the control and experimental vaccine groups for the low group.  
77 
 
Table 24c: High Religiosity & Different Frames on Vaccines Comparison 
Frame Observations Mean  
(Standard Error) 




97 0.81 (0.03) 0.27 (0.76, 0.87) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
107 0.79 (0.03) 0.26 (0.74, 0.85) 
Combined 204 0.80 (0.02) 0.27 (0.77, 0.84) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.02 (0.04)  (-0.06, 0.09) 
t = 0.4693; df = 202 
P (T < t) = 0.6803 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.6394 P (T > t) = 0.3197 
Here, I found there to be no difference between the scores of folks with high levels of religiosity 
who received the religious vaccine frame and those with comparable religiosity levels who 
received the control vaccine frame.  
Table 24d: Low Religiosity & Different Frames on Vaccines Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
69 0.84 (0.03) 0.25 (0.78, 0.90) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
86 0.81 (0.03) 0.27 (0.76, 0.87) 
Combined 155 0.83 (0.02) 0.27 (0.77, 0.84) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.03 (0.04)  (-0.06, 0.11) 
t = 0.6321; df = 153 
P (T < t) = 0.7359 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.5283 P (T > t) = 0.2641 
 
Similarly, there was no difference in the scores of the control and experiment groups when 
comparing those with lower levels of religiosity. In addition, I also examined the effectiveness of 
the religious frame on vaccines with folks who have medium levels of religiosity. Here too, the 
same reasoning as with the climate change experiment applies.  
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Table 24e: Medium Religiosity & Different Frames on Vaccines Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
65 0.70 (0.04) 0.32 (0.62, 0.78) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
84 0.70 (0.03) 0.31 (0.62, 0.76) 
Combined 149 0.70 (0.03) 0.31 (0.65, 0.75) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.01 (0.05)  (-0.09, 0.12) 
t = 0.2571; df = 147 
P (T < t) = 0.6013 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.7974 P (T > t) = 0.3987 
 
Here again, the religious frame had no effect for those with medium levels of religiosity in both 
the vaccines and climate change experiments.  
  One final paradigm to examine is the potential effectiveness of the frame on an 
individual who is already invested in the issue. It is possible that the religious appeal was more 
effective to someone for whom the issue is already of great importance. I will test this hypothesis 
in much the same way I tested the frame’s effectiveness across differing levels of religiosity.  
 In the case of climate change, I hypothesized that those for whom climate change is 
already an important issue will score higher on the experiment (regardless of the given frame). 
Further, the people who list climate change as an important issue will be unaffected by the 
religious frame, but the people who ascribe it a lower level of importance will be positively 













95% Confidence Interval 
High (T) 242 0.87 (0.01) 0.19 (0.84, 0.89) 
Low (t) 111 0.58 (0.03) 0.32 (0.52, 0.64) 
Combined 353 0.78 (0.01) 0.27 (0.75, 0.81) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.29 (0.03)  (0.23, 0.34) 
t = 10.4157; df = 351 
P (T < t) = 1.0000 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 P (T > t) = 0.0000 
Here, those who answered that they did not think the climate of the planet is currently warming 
were added to the low importance group. (A skip algorithm was introduced into the survey, so 
those who espoused the belief that the Earth’s climate is not changing would not be subjected to 
further global warming questions. Thus, it is uncertain exactly how these 24 people might have 
responded to the “importance” question. Nevertheless, I think they would likely behave similarly 
to the low importance group.) As expected, those who ascribed high importance to the issue also 
scored higher on the climate change experiment (regardless of the frame).  
Table 25a: High Importance & Different Frames on Climate Change Comparison  





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
129 0.87 (0.02) 0.18 (0.85, 0.91) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
113 0.85 (0.02) 0.21 (0.82, 0.90) 
Combined 242 0.87 (0.01) 0.19 (0.84, 0.89) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.02 (0.02)  (-0.03, 0.07) 
t = 0.7816; df = 240 
P (T < t) = 0.7824 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.4352 P (T > t) = 0.2176 
Here, there was no difference in the control and religious frames around climate change for folks 
who already describe it as an important issue to them.  
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Table 25b: Low Importance & Different Frames on Climate Change Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
50 0.56 (0.05) 0.32 (0.47, 0.65) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
61 0.60 (0.04) 0.31 (0.52, 0.68) 
Combined 111 0.58 (0.03) 0.32 (0.52, 0.64) 
Difference  (T-t) -0.04 (0.06)  (-0.16, 0.08) 
t = -0.7009; df = 109 
P (T < t) = 0.2424 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.4849 P (T > t) = 0.7576 
Contrary to my hypothesis, the religious frame was similarly ineffective for folks who ascribed a 
lower level of importance to climate change as an issue.  
 Additionally, like with the case of religiosity, it is also possible that those who ascribe 
middling importance to the issue (and express other “middle” positions on the 2020 Global 
Warming Scale) may be affected by the religious framing of the question more so than those who 
view the issue as unimportant and those who view it as paramount.  
Table 25c: Medium Importance & Different Frames on Climate Change Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
88 0.77 (0.02) 0.21 (0.73, 0.82) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
96 0.73 (0.03) 0.26 (0.68, 0.78) 
Combined 184 0.75 (0.04) 0.32 (0.72, 0.78) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.04 (0.04)  (-0.03, 0.11) 
t = 1.2415; df = 182 
P (T < t) = 0.8920 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.2160 P (T > t) = 0.1080 
Here, there was no difference between the religious and control frames for those who assign a 
medium level of importance to the climate crisis.  
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Similarly, in the case of vaccines, I hypothesize that people who assigned high 
importance to the issue of vaccines would also score high in the experiment (regardless of 
frame). Additionally, those for whom vaccines are already a salient issue, the religious frame 
will be ineffective at raising their support for the issue. However, for those who ascribe little 
importance to vaccines, the religious frame will be effective at increasing support.  








95% Confidence Interval 
High (T) 269 0.87 (0.01) 0.23 (0.84, 0.90) 
Low (t) 88 0.64 (0.03) 0.29 (0.57, 0.70) 
Combined 357 0.81 (0.01) 0.26 (0.79, 0.84) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.23 (0.03)  (0.18, 0.29) 
t = 7.8614; df = 355 
P (T < t) = 1.0000 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 P (T > t) = 0.0000 
Here, those who already viewed vaccines as important tend to score higher in the experiment, 
regardless of the presence of a religious frame. 
Table 26a: High Importance & Different Frames on Vaccines Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
124 0.87 (0.02) 0.23 (0.83, 0.91) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
145 0.87 (0.02) 0.22 (0.84, 0.91) 
Combined 269 0.87 (0.01) 0.23 (0.84, 0.90) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.00 (0.03)  (-0.06, 0.05) 
t = -0.1255; df = 267 
P (T < t) = 0.4501 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.9002 P (T > t) = 0.5499 
Among those who had listed the vaccines as most important to them, there was no difference 
between the religious and control groups on the experiment. Here, these findings confirm my 
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hypothesis that for folks who already think vaccines are important, there is no discernable effect 
of the religious frame. 
Table 26b: Low Importance & Different Frames on Vaccines Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
41 0.68 (0.05) 0.29 (0.59, 0.77) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
47 0.60 (0.04) 0.29 (0.51, 0.68) 
Combined 88 0.64 (0.03) 0.29 (0.57, 0.70) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.09 (0.06)  (-0.04, 0.21) 
t = 1.4102; df = 86 
P (T < t) = 0.9190 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.1621 P (T > t) = 0.0810 
Furthermore, in the cases of those for whom vaccines was not an important issue, the religious 
frame was also ineffective. Indeed, there may even be some evidence that those who received the 
treatment language may have scored lower rather than higher as predicted (p = 0.0810). Since 
this is only slight evidence (and it goes in the opposite direction of the hypothesis), I would 
describe this as strong evidence against my hypothesis. Thus, the frame was not effective among 
the low importance group.  
 Finally, I compare the effects of the religious language frame for those who ascribe only 
a medium level of importance to the issues of vaccines. Again, I expect that those in this middle 
category have the most malleable opinions, leading to a potential positive impact of the religious 




Table 26c: Medium Importance & Different Frames on Vaccines Comparison 





95% Confidence Interval 
Control 
Frame (T) 
81 0.84 (0.02) 0.22 (0.79, 0.88) 
Religious 
Frame (t) 
98 0.79 (0.03) 0.25 (0.74, 0.84) 
Combined 179 0.81 (0.04) 0.23 (0.78, 0.85) 
Difference  (T-t) 0.05 (0.04)  (-0.02, 0.12) 
t = 1.2951; df = 177 
P (T < t) = 0.9015 P (|T| > |t|) = 0.1970 P (T > t) = 0.0985 
Here too, like with the low importance group, those who ascribe a medium level of importance to 
vaccine issues scored slightly lower when given the religious frame when compared to those 
same folks who received the control question (p = 0.0985). Again, like with the previous group, 
the higher p-value reflects some slight significance, but nothing overwhelming. Thus, it appears 
that the religious frame was ineffective at promoting support for the vaccine issue among those 
who had medium-level vaccines scores. 
  
V. DISCUSSION 
The outcomes of this project were not all uniform or expected. Pretty much the only 
hypothesis I was able to confirm was my Partisan Climate Change Hypothesis. Nearly every 
other hypothesis I proposed turned out to be not supported by the evidence. However, this does 
not mean I did not learn anything valuable, or that I am unable to show anything for it. Indeed, I 
was able to enumerate a few key findings. First, I found a significant difference in partisan 
opinions both about climate change and vaccines. Further, there was a noticeable difference 
between results depending on the types of questions around global warming. Republicans seem 
more oppositional to climate change in the abstract, but merely express a lack of support for 
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(rather than direct opposition to) specific policies such as higher efficiency standards or 
government regulations. In addition, I found a significant effect of religiosity in relation to both 
issues. In both cases, an increase in religiosity was associated with opposition to the science-
based side of each issue. For climate change, it meant a lack of support for policies designed to 
combat it, and for vaccines it correlated with an increased belief in a link between vaccines and 
autism.  
Moreover, I did find some evidence for an interaction between party identity and 
religiosity on these issues. The effect of religiosity for Republicans in relation to abstract effects 
of climate change was smaller than its general effect (although it still maintained the same 
direction). In contrast when it comes to specific policies there was no significant Republican 
interaction with religiosity. For vaccines, the interaction with Republicans is not uniform for all 
levels of religiosity. Indeed, the most significant effects are for those with medium levels of 
religiosity, rather than the extremes. 
Finally, the results of the experiment were contrary to my hypotheses. I initially predicted 
that my religious language would be effective at increasing support for vaccines and climate 
change policies. This proved not to be the case. There were no significant differences in means 
of each group on the different questions. The frames were also no more effective for those with 
high levels of religiosity or for people who already considered the issue to be important. The 
frames were also ineffective at motivating religious Republicans more than religious Democrats. 
Additionally, the folks in the middle of these scales also experienced no effect from the religious 
language.   
Ultimately, the final outcomes of my project are mixed. Most notably, my multivariate 
analyses illustrate some key distinctions between opinions of Republicans when compared to 
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Democrats on science-based issues. Further, I hope my examinations of religiosity’s role in 
opinion formation helps illuminate its importance as a political predisposition. While I was 
unable to effectively prime religiosity like I had planned, I still think there are important 
takeaways from the experiment section of my thesis. A more detailed discussion of these lessons 
appears in the following section on the limitations of my project. 
Limitations 
 There were multiple limitations associated with this project. It appears that religiosity is 
much more difficult to manipulate than I had previously thought. Future researchers should 
employ a more targeted sampling strategy and tailor religious language to specific denominations 
to yield the most effective results. Here, future researchers would also likely be able to improve 
upon the scales I constructed from the survey. By having a more targeted sample, they could ask 
similarly targeted religiosity questions, rather than the more general ones I employed. Further, 
there are likely other ways to combine questions such that they form neater scales.28 
However, I suspect that this religious appeal will only be effective for those with 
middling levels of religiosity. These are the folks who have enough religiosity for it to be made 
salient by the question, but it is not already an opinion ingredient used by the respondent 
ordinarily. In contrast, for the folks with the highest levels of it, religiosity is already salient (and 
a prime factor) in their opinion formation. For those with little-to-no religiosity, they do not 
factor it in at all. Moreover, for these people, a religious reminder may even cause them to move 
in the opposite direction on the issue than was intended by the researcher. In addition, there may 
be some merit to explore the effects of consistent, repeated, religious appeals across multiple 
 
28 This comment extends to all my scales (not just my religiosity one).  
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issues. Further, it would be interesting to see if a more targeted religious appeal is effective for 
some denominations over others.  
Conclusion  
 In the end, many aspects of the gap between religiosity and science still exist. 
Furthermore, the results of this thesis indicate that using religion to motivate support for science-
based issues is unlikely to be effective. However, there are still religious folks in the Democratic 
party (or on the left) for whom their religion serves as an important motivator in their opinion 
formation. Although this group may be a minority on the left, I still think they are a valuable 
group to study, since they utilize a seemingly right-wing framework to arrive at left-wing 
conclusions. In the future, I hope to further investigate this relationship and expand it beyond 
science-based issues to other left-wing policy opinions.  
 Moreover, these questions about religiosity and left-wing politics are of a personal nature 
for me. Personally, I would describe myself as a religious individual (although, I am not sure 
how high I would score on my own religiosity scale). Like those with high levels of religiosity, 
my own religious identity is already an important opinion ingredient I reach for when I form 
political opinions. With this project, I hoped to explore my own process in opinion formation as 
well as see what I can do to understand how others come to their conclusions. Hopefully, I will 
be able to apply what I learned here to other religious folks, to better understand why they may 
arrive at different conclusions than me. Perhaps future research will do more to help bridge this 






List of Survey Questions (2020):  
I. Vaccines 
1. Experiment:  
Religious Frame Control 
Some people say they have a moral obligation 
to value life, health, and the prevention of 
suffering (particularly of children and other 
innocents) through vaccinations. Other 
people believe that getting vaccinated is 
ineffective at accomplishing this goal.  
 
To what extent would you say it is important 








To what extent would you say it is important 
to get vaccinated? 
Answers: A great deal (4), A lot (3), A moderate amount (2), A little (1), None at all (0) 
2. Some people think there is a link between vaccines and autism. How likely do you think 
it is for this to be true?  
Answers: Extremely likely (-2), Somewhat likely (-1), Neither likely nor unlikely (0), 
Somewhat unlikely (1), Extremely unlikely (2)  
3. Some people do not take a vaccine because of religious or cultural reasons. To what 
extent do you think they are risking their health or the health of the community? 
Answers: A great deal (4), A lot (3), A moderate amount (2), A little (1), None at all (0) 
4. How important is the issue of vaccinations you your personally? 
Answers: Extremely important (4), Very important (3), Moderately important (2), 





II. Climate Change  
1. Experiment:  
Religious Frame Control 
Some people think humanity are stewards of 
the environment and we have a moral 
responsibility to address global warming, by 
protecting our Earth and all of Creation. 
Others think the Earth was given to humanity 
to do with as we please.  
 
To what extent should we be supporting 









To what extent should we be supporting 
government action to slow the Earth's 
warming?  
 
Answers: A great deal (4), A lot (3), A moderate amount (2), A little (1), None at all (0) 
2. Which of the following appears to be closest to your views about what is causing the 
Earth's climate to get warmer? 
Answers: It is caused mostly by human activity (1), It is caused mostly by natural causes 
(-1), It is caused about equally by human activity and natural causes (0), I do not think 
the climate is getting warmer (n/a) 
3. Policymakers have considered many proposals to reduce the effects of global temperature 
increases. What is your opinion on the following proposals: 
a. Increased government regulation on businesses that produce a great deal of 
greenhouse emissions linked to climate change. 
Answers: Favor strongly (2), Favor somewhat (1), Neither favor nor oppose (0), Oppose 
somewhat (-1), Oppose strongly (-2) 
b. Higher fuel efficiency standards for cars and trucks. 
Answers: Favor strongly (2), Favor somewhat (1), Neither favor nor oppose (0), Oppose 
somewhat (-1), Oppose strongly (-2) 
4. How important is the issue of increasing global temperatures to you personally? 
Answers: Extremely important (4), Very important (3), Moderately important (2), 




1. What is your present religion, if any? Are you…  
Answers: Protestant, Roman Catholic, Orthodox Christian (such as Greek or Russian 
Orthodox), Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, atheist, agnostic, something else 
[text box], nothing in particular 
a. (if “nothing in particular”) Would you say that is atheist, agnostic, Christian, or nothing 
in particular?  
Answers: atheist, agnostic, Christian, nothing in particular  
2. Lots of things come up that keep people from attending religious services even if they 
want to. Thinking about your life these days, how often would you say you attend 
religious services?  
Answers: Every week (4), Almost every week (3), Once or twice a month (2), A few 
times a year (1), Never (0) 
3. How often do you engage in personal prayer (regardless of whether or not you attend 
religious services)?  
Answers: Several times a day (4), Once a day (3), A few times a week (2), Less than once 
week (1), Never (0) 
4. How often would you say you spend time with non-family members of your same 
religion outside of religious services? 
Answers: Several times a day (6), More than once a week (5), Once a week (4), Almost 
every week (3), Once or twice a month (2), A few times a year (1), Rarely (0) 
5. How often would you say that you feel like your true self around those who share your 
religious beliefs?  
Answers: All the time (4), Most of the time (3), Some of the time (2), A little of the time 
(1), None of the time (0) 
6. How important is belonging to your religious group to your personal identity?  
Answers: Extremely important (4), Very important (3), Moderately important (2), 
Slightly important (1), Not at all important (0) 
7. Do you believe in God? 
Answers: Definitely yes (2), Probably yes (1), Might or might not (0), Probably not (-1), 
Definitely not (-2) 
8. How often would you say that you read the Holy Book of your religion?  
Answers: At least once a week (4), Once or twice a month (3), Several times a year (2), 




9. Which comes closest to your view about the origins of the Holy Book of your religion?  
Answers: Scripture is the word of God (2/3), Scripture is a book written by human beings 
and is not the word of God (0), Scripture is a Divinely inspired book, but written by 
human beings (1/2) 
a. (if Scripture is the word of God, or Scripture is a Divinely inspired book, but written by 
human beings) Which comes closest to your view about interpreting the Holy Book of 
your religion? 
Answers: Scripture is to be taken literally, word for word (3), Not everything in scripture 





1. Which of the following best describes where you live?  
Answers: City / urban area, Suburban area, Small town, Country / rural area  
2. Which category best describes you? 
Answers: White, Hispanic or Latino, Black or African American, Asian, American Indian 
or Alaska Native, Middle Eastern or North African, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander, Some other race, ethnicity or origin  
3. What year were you born? 
Answers: [text box] 
4. What is your highest level of education? 
Answers: Less than high school, High school graduate, Some college, 2 year degree, 4 
year degree, Professional degree, Doctorate 
5. What is your total household income? 
Answers: No income, $1 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to 
$99,999, $100,000 to $199,999, $200,000 and over 
6. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
independent, or what? 
Answers: Republican, Democrat, Independent, Something else 
7. Which of the following comes closer to your beliefs about the size of government? 
Answers (1-7 scale): The government has gotten bigger because it has gotten involved in 
things that people should do for themselves; The government has gotten bigger because 
the problems we face have gotten bigger. 
8. Which of the following comes closest to your beliefs about equality and individual 
freedom? 
Answers (1-7 scale): Individual freedom is more important that equality; Equality is more 
important that individual freedom 
9. Which of the following best describes your sexual orientation? 
Answers: Heterosexual (straight), Homosexual (gay), Bisexual, Other, Prefer not to say  
10. Please indicate your gender identity. 
Answers: Woman, Man, Transgender woman, Transgender man, Non-conforming / non-
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